

Life after the Global Stocktake

Six Steps from Diagnosis to Third Generation NDCs

The Global Stocktake (GST) is a key mechanism of the Paris Agreement to ensure that countries will collectively progress towards its long-term climate goals. Every five years, the GST process assesses countries' progress and informs the next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) by 'taking stock' of the current state of global climate action. If NDCs are the beating heart of the Paris Agreement, the GST is its cardiologist.¹ And the first check-up did not look good. It concluded in 2023 at the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Dubai. While some progress was reported, collective actions remained grossly insufficient to limit global warming to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial times. The recent NDC Synthesis Report 2024 finds that the implementation of all current NDCs would reduce emissions by only 2.6% by 2030 compared to 2019, far from the required 43%, and potentially leading to a devastating warming of 3.1°C.²

As such, the GST is not just as a series of diagnostic reports and dialogues but a firm call for action. The real test of the process will be turning the GST outcomes into practice. At COP29 in Azerbaijan, countries were meant to rigorously discuss the operationalisation and implementation of the GST's findings but overall did not deliver. In this context, this briefing (1) describes the GST general process, (2) the outcomes of the very first GST and (3) COP29 for the GST. It finally presents (4) recommendations on how to translate the GST into broader political action.

1 The Global Stocktake process

The Paris Agreement established the GST as a mechanism to determine the status of climate action globally at regular intervals. In the agreement, countries established the GST's timeline and general purpose and, three years later, in 2018, they also agreed on its technical modalities, that is the sources and information that would inform it.³ The governing body of the Paris Agreement, the CMA, is charged with conducting the GSTs. Although the GST technically concludes with a formal political outcome decision, it is not a singular document but a two-year long process, which includes multiple reports, international dialogues and encompasses three, at times overlapping, components or phases.⁴

In the **first phase, information is collected and processed** from a wide range of sources, including international organisations, non-party stakeholders, and international organisations. Relevant information includes the NDCs,⁵ scientific studies (such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC), biennial transparency reports, data on financial flows, and equity aspects, among others. The two permanent subsidiary bodies, SBSTA and SBI of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are also mandated to support the CMA and can request further inputs, especially for the technical assessment to address potential

¹ See World Resources Institute, 2024, [Navigating the Paris Rulebook. Global Stocktake](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

² UNFCCC, 2024, [Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Synthesis Report by the Secretariat](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

³ UNFCCC, 2019, [Report of the Conference of the Parties, Katowice](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

⁴ UNFCCC, 2024, [Components of the Global Stocktake](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

⁵ For an introduction to the next generation of NDCs, see [Chennamaneni, L., Lydén, P. \(Germanwatch\), 2024. A Primer on Nationally Determined Contributions 3.0](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

gaps.⁶ The UNFCCC secretariat synthesises and compiles reports on various issues, e.g. on the state of GHG emissions, adaptation efforts, etc. This phase takes approximately one year to complete.

The **second** phase is the **technical assessment** of the information collected through a series of dedicated dialogues with representatives from Parties and non-party stakeholders (including the IPCC), held over two or three UN climate conferences. They conclude with a summary report and an overarching factual synthesis.

The **third phase** is the **consideration of outputs**, the political assessment of the results of the technical dialogues in high-level political meetings. Here, Parties discuss the implications of the findings and key messages to update and enhance their actions and support, in a nationally determined manner and in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement. The final outputs are referenced in a CMA decision. The first GST in 2023 took the place of the cover decision at COP28 in Dubai.⁷

Throughout the GST process, non-state actors, in particular civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, youth groups, and research institutions, play a pivotal role in driving ambitious climate goals. Their inputs and on-site expertise of best practices and persisting inequalities were crucial to address information and data gaps in the collection and assessment phases. Despite obstacles to their closer involvement in the political assessment, their interventions were vital for cross-cutting issues that urgently need to be recognised in the GST's operationalisation and upcoming iterations, for instance to real-ise rights-based, gender-responsive approaches.

2 Outcomes of the first GST

The first GST's key outcomes⁸ call (1) for the first time, to transition away from all fossil fuels in energy systems to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. It also calls (2) to adopt and implement a comprehensive energy package by 2030, including tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, the significant reduction of non-carbon emissions, in particular methane, and a reduction of emissions from road transport. Crucially, the GST (3) reiterated that current national climate targets, even if implemented completely, are highly insufficient to limit global warming to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels.⁹

The GST decision did also contain a number of serious loopholes and shortcomings.¹⁰ For example some of the proposed measures of the energy package will hardly help defend against the climate crisis, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and so-called 'low-emissions' technologies such as nuclear energy. Moreover, there was no agreement on support measures for adequate implementation (e.g. financing, capacity-building, ...) and there was no direct reference to the Mitigation Work Programme. Further concerns are the phase-down of 'unabated' coal without a timeline and the use of 'transitional fuels', in particular gas.

2.1 Political dynamics and COP29 outcomes

The GST is not just a technical assessment that identifies gaps but an inherently political process, especially around the question on how to respond to these gaps. This is due to the potentially far-reaching prescriptive implications of its content touching on national sovereignty (manifested as NDCs), fiscal issues, and

⁶ UNFCCC, 2024, [Global Stocktake Governance and Facilitation](#); UNFCCC, 2024, [Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice \(SBSTA\)](#); UNFCCC, 2024, [Subsidiary Body for Implementation \(SBI\)](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

⁷ UNFCCC, 2024, [1/CMA5](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

⁸ Ryfisch, D., et al. (Germanwatch), 2024, [COP28 Debrief](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

⁹ UNFCCC, 2024, [1/CMA5](#), para. 22; IPCC, 2023, [Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

¹⁰ Ryfisch, D., et al. (Germanwatch), 2024, [COP28 Debrief](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

policymaking. The GST and, by extension, the NDCs are also linked to financial negotiations with developing countries on reliable funding for more ambitious targets.

Despite agreement on the formal content of the first GST at COP28 to much celebration, which seemingly provided momentum to overcome the entrenched North-South binary, fundamentally diverging ideas of its meaning prevail between parties. Some countries have interpreted the GST as an à la carte menu of policy options, rather than a comprehensive call for action that needs to be implemented in its entirety. Conflicts over interpretation and scope of the GST surfaced in June 2024, at the session of the Subsidiary Bodies in Bonn (SB60), when developed countries and some island states argued that the GST should bundle up binding measures for all countries to increase their ambitions. Conversely, many developing countries pushed for more flexibility and a stronger focus on the financing elements.

At COP29, disagreement escalated in forums where the GST could have been discussed, resulting in a weak compromise despite urgent needs.¹¹ The UAE Dialogue for instance stalled and was ultimately referred to the SB in Bonn in June 2025 (SB62) after countries could not find agreement. The key issue remained the scope of the GST, where developed countries, including the EU, UK, and the US supporting a wide mandate whereas many developing countries, including Brazil, focused on financial support, capacity-building, and technology transfer for the implementation of NDCs. Instead of a strong signal for ambition, the failure of the negotiations about the Dialogue raises serious concerns for the development of third generation NDCs whose deadline is in February. It also increases pressure on incoming COP-Presidency Brazil to create new momentum in an already much advanced process. The outcome of the Mitigation Work Programme, a key arena to drive the implementation (and improvement) of the energy package of the GST, likewise failed to close the existing ambition gap with a last-resort minimal consensus.

This year, discussions over the GST and new NDCs coincided with negotiations over a New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). The GST itself references its proximity to the NCQG.¹² Many developing countries were reluctant to integrate the GST as a package and to announce new national climate targets in 2025 without prior commitments by developed countries to ramp up funding at this year's COP. This seemed obvious, given their unmet needs and developed countries' failure to provide agreed means in the past. Meanwhile, developed countries demanded higher ambition and detailed investment plans, independently of discussions about a global finance goal. Discussions of the GST and the NCQG were linked: no money, no ambition. Despite its name, the 'Baku Climate Unity Pact'¹³ could not mask the deep disappointment building up during the process¹⁴ and immediately after the adoption of a new climate finance goal of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035.¹⁵ Clearly, unity must be built, not declared. Though a separate stocktake for the finance goal is planned for 2030, this outcome does not provide the much-needed immediate support for developing countries to develop new NDCs. Industrialized countries must urgently correct course and concert a campaign to rebuild trust through substantive action and fast-start finance.

¹¹ Schäfer, L., et al. (Germanwatch), 2024, [Climate Policy in Times of Crisis. Weak Compromises Despite Urgent Needs](#) (accessed: 17 December 2024).

¹² UNFCCC, 2024, [CMA5](#), para. 94 (accessed: 10 December 2024).

¹³ UNFCCC, 2024, [Baku Climate Unity Pact](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

¹⁴ Aljazeera, 23 November 2024, [Developing Nations Say \\$300bn COP29 Deal Not Enough after Agreement](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

¹⁵ Noor, D., Carrington, D. (The Guardian), 24 November 2024, [COP29 Climate Finance Deal Criticised as 'Travesty of Justice' and 'Stage-managed'](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

3 Recommendations

The outcomes of COP29 and the political dynamics surrounding the GST made one thing very clear: a comprehensive GST will not trickle down into NDCs and national policy by itself. Decision-makers have to grapple with a difficult geopolitical environment, a corrosion of trust between Global South and North and an escalating climate crisis that leaves no room for further delay. We have outlined six actionable recommendations for policymakers to address key GST issues below.

3.1 Finance and means of implementation

There is no way around for developed countries to **drastically increase financial commitments** to meet the demands of developing countries. This is in line with the Paris Agreement, their historical responsibilities, and greater capacities. In 2022, developed countries for the first time reached their annual goal of USD 100 billion in climate finance, with much delay and still far from actual needs.¹⁶ Cost estimates of only a subsection of current (and insufficient) NDCs of developing countries range between USD 5–6.8 trillion with varying cut-off dates in the coming years.¹⁷ This already outstrips existing financial support levels by an order of magnitude. Global estimates even point to around USD 1 trillion a year by 2030, to meet the climate goals of developing countries (excluding China) alone.¹⁸ Unsurprisingly then, countries such as India demanded a floor of USD 1 trillion per year in preparation of the NCQG negotiations and found the outcome of COP29 unacceptable. While COP29 increased funding to USD 300 billion, this does not provide a realistic path for developing countries to set up NDCs with the ambition level required in the next decade. Developed countries must rapidly increase their public (largely grants-based) financing, without which fair and equitable NDCs in line with the Paris Agreement are impossible. Private financial flows must also be mobilised, according to robust standards, to complement rather than substitute public commitments.

Aside improving quantity and quality of finance, developed countries must actively **drive reform of the existing financial architecture**, as mentioned in the GST.¹⁹ This includes reforms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and multilateral development banks.²⁰ It also includes supporting the establishment of new financial instruments, in particular levies on international air and maritime transport. Developed countries should also join and advocate for a tax on billionaires, as championed by the Brazilian G20 Presidency and other countries.²¹ While reforms are not just about climate finance, it will be important to mainstream climate consideration into discussions on increasing fiscal space.

3.2 The essence of NDCs: ‘1.5°C aligned’

The GST reiterates the Paris Agreement when it calls on parties’ NDCs to be ‘aligned with limiting global warming to 1.5°C’²² as held by the latest science in respecting different national circumstances. However, the methodology to calculate 1.5°C-alignment of NDCs is challenging due to the bottom-up nature of the Paris Agreement. So far, countries have not agreed on a common approach, as the controversial issue

¹⁶ OECD, 2024, [Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

¹⁷ UNFCCC, 2024, [Report of the Standing Committee on Finance](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

¹⁸ Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, 2023, [A Climate Finance Framework: Decisive Action to Deliver on the Paris Agreement](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

¹⁹ UNFCCC, 2024, [CMA5](#), para 95, 96 (accessed: 10 December 2024).

²⁰ Kotzias, M., et al., 2023, [Reform of the International Financial Architecture](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

²¹ Elliott, L. (The Guardian), 25 April 2024, [World’s Billionaires Should Pay Minimum 2% Wealth Tax. Say G20 Ministers](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

²² UNFCCC, 2024, [CMA5](#), para. 39 (accessed: 10 December 2024).

raises fundamental equity and distributive questions around the remaining collective carbon budget. Instead of risking a deadlock, strategic engagement should acknowledge unlikely methodological agreement in the near future. But even in its absence, it is clear that new **NDCs must include a set of essential elements** policymakers need to ensure. Among others,²³ this entails:

1. following a just, equitable, and human rights based transition approach, which centres fairness and sustainable development;
2. absolute and sector-specific emissions reduction targets for 2035, with developed countries in the lead, according to the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) principle;
3. transparency on their respective definition of 1.5°C and how their NDCs are responding to the GST, including comprehensive data, methods, and distributive assumptions;
4. net zero emission goals for developed countries until 2040 and until mid-century for developing countries. Finally;
5. 1.5°C aligned NDCs must end the expansion of both, production and export of fossil fuels.

Governments with greater capacity in particular must commit to rapidly phasing out coal, oil, and gas production and end all fossil subsidies. Such a comprehensive view of NDCs must be backed by adequate support levels.

3.3 Signals of ambition

The implementation of the GST should be an example of international co-operation amidst a multitude of crises, shifting geopolitical power, and a prevailing distrust in the multilateral system. However, at COP29 countries did not move the GST forward. Many heads of governments skipped the event entirely and the deadline for third generation NDCs in mid-February 2025 is fast approaching (and many countries likely to miss it). **Ambitious early-movers** now need to come forward and send signals of ambition, solidarity, and support, contributing their fair share and simultaneously increasing expectations for the NDCs of other countries.

Much attention had been on the COP presidency Troika of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Azerbaijan, and Brazil, to be those early movers after their announcements to present 1.5°C aligned NDCs at COP29. NDCs of Brazil and the UAE included tentatively positive signs although they were not 1.5°C-aligned and did not address plans for a fossil fuel phase-out (Azerbaijan did not present any goals). Brazil presented their NDC on time, including targets for emissions reductions and strengthened co-ordination with subnational actors.²⁴ As the incoming COP Presidency, the country must now spearhead the GST's comprehensive operationalisation and accelerate its implementation (including of Brazil's own targets) in the build-up to, at, and beyond COP30. This also includes advancing the 'Roadmap to Mission 1.5' of the Troika to build a strong coalition for climate ambition and specifying the 'Roadmap Baku–Belém' for additional financing. Also, it is clear that developed countries must do more. At COP29, the UK did announce an emissions reduction target of 81% by 2035 compared to 1990²⁵ levels and played a constructive role in negotiations. The UK government must build on these encouraging signals when presenting its complete NDCs.

²³ Germanwatch and more than a dozen of other organisations have developed ten tests that NDCs should pass for countries to stay on track and limit global warming, see: [Ten Tests for Countries' New Climate Plans that Will Make or Break 1.5C](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

²⁴ Though comprehensive, the Brazilian NDC failed to address planned investments in fossil fuels and lacks speed, see Climate Observatory, 13 November 2024, [NDC Misaligned with Lula's Promises. Says OC](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

²⁵ UK Government, 12 November 2024, [The UK's 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution Emissions Reduction Target under the Paris Agreement](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

Likewise, the EU's NDC will be a key benchmark for many other countries and must combine ambitious targets with substantial support measures. Alongside Canada, Mexico, and others, the EU has pledged 'deep, rapid, and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.5°C' at COP29.²⁶ To bring substance to the rhetoric, the new commission must push for at least 90% emissions cuts by 2040 and a nonlinear reduction target for 2035. The German government should support such a goal as well as a target for fossil fuel phase-out and an end to all fossil subsidies across the board. This is crucial to generate momentum in light of the EU set to miss the key February deadline. Late submissions must be worthwhile by higher ambition.

In light of the opening space in international climate politics left by the US, signals must also come from all G20 members, recognising the group's heterogeneity. It is still technically possible to limit global warming to 1.5°C but their leadership and ambition will be key and must go far beyond the recent declaration.²⁷

3.4 Partnerships and participation

Developed countries in particular must strengthen diplomatic efforts towards **comprehensive support and partnerships** to facilitate climate action in the Global South, targeting the implementation of the GST and the development of ambitious NDCs 3.0. This must include broad stakeholder outreach and institutionalised dialogue formats. The Multi-Stakeholder Alliance announced by German Foreign Minister Baerbock at the Petersberg Climate Dialogue 2024 is a welcome initiative in this regard but must be filled with life. The struggling international climate debates could benefit from an early next Dialogue in 2025, also to intensify co-operation with incoming COP presidency Brazil.

Strengthening the participation of CSOs in global climate governance, in particular from developing countries and frontline communities, will be key for the development and implementation of ambitious NDCs and GSTs in the future.²⁸ Streamlining the GST into national policy can build on the existing NDC Partnership and its recent NDC 3.0 Navigator. Although they signal political interest, more resources are required to enhance technical support levels.²⁹

There is also scope for **improved engagement with existing South–North formats**, such as the International Solar Alliance and the Accelerated Partnership for Renewables Africa. Also, dedicated bi- and minilateral Energy and Climate Partnerships can complement multilateral agreements. Just and fair partnerships with large developing economies, in particular China, India, and Brazil will be central in this regard and should be expanded. Developed countries must use them to tailor support measures such as financial and technical support, and technical co-operation, to developing countries' national priorities.

The idea of partnerships must also extend to actors and communities within countries. As the GST must inform the next generation of NDCs, governments should **proactively seek engagement with a broad set of (national) stakeholders** on how to streamline it into the national political agenda, and eventually policy. To ensure a just and fair political process, outreach should be low-threshold, provide enabling capacity and knowledge for meaningful participation in particular for groups affected by them, including workers, Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, and marginalised and poor communities. Crucially, participatory, democratic processes of policy formulation increase legitimacy, ownership, and the quality of policies.³⁰ Hence, countries

²⁶ European Commission, 21 November 2024, [COP29: Joint Press Release on 1.5°C-aligned Ambition in NDCs toward Net Zero](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

²⁷ Patel, C. (Climate Group), 20 November 2024, [Why the G20 was a Missed Opportunity to Send Strong Signal on Fossil Fuel Phaseout](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

²⁸ Qi, J. J., et al., 2024, [Reflections on the First Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement](#), Earth System Governance, Vol 21 (accessed: 10 December 2024).

²⁹ Adolphsen, O., Könnke, J., Thielges, S., 2024, [Third Generation of Nationally Determined Contributions](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

³⁰ See Hermwille, L., et al., 2024, [How Can the Global Stocktake be Leveraged for Enhanced Climate Action?](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

must create transparent mechanisms to include in particular civil society in the translation of the GST into a national reality.

3.5 Implementing the energy package

Policymakers should focus on the implementation of the energy package of the GST (§ 28, 1/CMA.5) as the main deliverable of the NDCs 3.0. There can be no 1.5°C alignment without robust implementation of mitigation measures, in particular by phasing out fossil fuels, as well as by tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling energy efficiency gains by 2030 (see 3.2). At COP29, the cross-cutting issue of energy was not advanced. The UAE Dialogue was on the edge of falling behind UAE Consensus; the Mitigation Work Programme's outcome was stripped off progressive commitments and the Just Transition Work Programme ended without consensus. This will not suffice to close the vast ambition and implementation gap by 2030.

It is clear that developed countries, in line with the CBDR-RC principle, must take the lead here by setting **stronger targets coupled to stringent implementation**. They also need to provide the means of implementation for developing countries efforts (see 3.1 and 3.3). Supporting implementation requires recognition of regional differences. The collective goal of tripling renewables translates very differently across the globe. For instance, a regional breakdown of 1.5°C compatible renewables deployment for Sub-Saharan Africa would require a more than six-fold increase of existing capacities by 2030 (taking into account current capacities, fossil fuel replacement, and demand growth), which requires significant upscaling of support and international financing.³¹

Implementing the energy package also means combining higher ambition with **better international co-operation on existing programmes** and policies within developing countries. India for example is rapidly expanding its renewables but the implementation of its policies targeting households and co-operatives could benefit from stronger co-operation with international partners. The focus on the practical side of the GST's energy package and its implementation offers the opportunity to bring multilateral goals into national policy plans and provides much better chances to build coalitions across developed and developing countries.

Finally, the expansion of mitigation technology must not come at the expense of human rights and the environment but **ensure a just and sustainable transition**. Large-scale renewables projects and the extraction of minerals underpinning the growth of renewables infrastructure have come under scrutiny for their adverse impacts on communities and ecosystems. A green transition requires stringent social and environmental standards, the reduction of industrial waste, overconsumption, and a ramp-up of recycling efforts towards a just, fair, and circular economy.

3.6 Strengthening adaptation

In a world that is already facing the ferocity of the climate crisis, inaction is far more costly than action. Human lives and ecosystems are under severe threat, and damages of extreme weather events linked to climate change have reached an estimated USD 143 billion per year.³² The good news is that adaptation works. Investments in e.g. resilient agriculture and storm defences can save and improve the lives of millions.³³ They

³¹ Grant, N., et al., 2024, [Tripling Renewables by 2030: Interpreting the Global Goal at the Regional Level](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

³² Newman, R., Noy, I., 2023, [The Global Costs of Extreme Weather that are Attributable to Climate Change](#), Nature Communications (accessed: 10 December 2024).

³³ Sulser, T., et al. (International Food Policy Research Institute), 2021, [Climate Change and Hunger: Estimating Costs of Adaptation in the Agrifood System](#); Haque, U., et al., 2011, [Reduced Death Rates from Cyclones in Bangladesh: What More Needs to Be Done?](#), Bull World Health Organ 90(2) (accessed: 17 December 2024).

must therefore be an integral part of the ‘systems transformations’³⁴ the GST calls for. This requires **integrating adaptation and resilience components into NDCs**. COP29 did make modest progress on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), providing more clarity on the procedural part for the development of indicators used to measure progress on the GGA. There was also agreement on the ‘Baku Adaptation Roadmap’, which aims to support the implementation of the UAE framework for Global Climate Resilience. However, negotiations were overall process rather than substance focused and the relationship between implementing the GST and adaptation measures were largely missing.

A positive development to build on is that an increasing number of 81% of countries include an adaptation component in their current NDCs, most of which prioritise sectors such as food security, water resources, and ecosystems. There is also a stronger consideration of gender and the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples, which must be expanded. Also, 171 countries have at least one national adaptation planning instrument (policy, strategy or plan) in place. Countries also highlight synergies between adaptation measures and the work towards Sustainable Development Goals as well as co-benefits by linking mitigation and adaptation efforts.³⁵ Implementing a comprehensive GST must include **better alignment of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) with the next generation of NDCs**. NDCs should set out high-level national targets, including sectoral ambitions, financial needs, and corresponding timeframes and indicators for targets and evaluation of adaptation measures.³⁶ NAPs in turn must focus on the implementation of targets, responding to the GGA while also being tailored to national and local circumstances.

Policymakers must also recognise the deeply contextual nature of adaptation measures, responding to local priorities and communities.³⁷ In part, this means productively using the newly created Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation on the implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, which will be held in parallel to upcoming COPs.³⁸ With the mitigation agenda under pressure, governments must not let adaptation (further) fall by the wayside. It will also be imperative to use the opportunity for **global learning from local champions** and pioneering practices, in particular in the Global South.³⁹

Finally, though the GST highlighted gaps in adaptation finance, it did not go much beyond. The NCQG only called for a ‘balance’ (§13 11/CMA.6) of its sparse funds between mitigation and adaptation. Policymakers must rapidly close gaps, e.g. by **delivering on financing the Global Goal on Adaptation** in 2025 to bolster implementation efforts by developing countries beyond technocratic dialogues.

4 Conclusion

The first GST has painted a grim picture of the current state of collective national efforts to limit global warming, despite improvements. In addition, the outcome of COP29 has done little to generate momentum for an ambitious implementation needed in the critical decade ahead. To the contrary, key achievements of the past are under siege. It is high time for policymakers to correct course through concerted efforts. The six recommendations outlined above will be key steps in this regard: finance, substantial NDCs,

³⁴ UNFCCC, 2024, [Technical Dialogue of the First Global Stocktake: Synthesis Report by the Co-facilitators on the Technical Dialogue](#), para. 3.

³⁵ UNFCCC, 2024, [Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Synthesis Report by the Secretariat](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

³⁶ Fransen, T., et al. (World Resources Institute), 2024, [9 Things to Know About National Climate Plans \(NDCs\)](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

³⁷ International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2024, [After COP 28: What's Next for Adaptation?](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

³⁸ International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2024, [COP 29 Outcome Moves Needle on Finance](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

³⁹ Sharma, A. (Ed.) (Global Center on Adaptation), 2023, [Stories of Resilience: Lessons from Local Adaptation Practice](#) (accessed: 10 December 2024).

political signals, partnerships, the energy package, and adaptation. They underline the responsibility especially of developed countries to take the lead with bold actions and to provide the support required for the implementation of the GST and the development of new NDCs.

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