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The New Nature of COPs

COP30 is different from all previous COPs, and future COPs will rather follow the character of COP30. The reason is simple: UN climate negotiations have gone from negotiating rules, to actually having to deal with the substance of mitigating and adapting to climate change.

This article is an extended version of a German text originally published by Table.Media.

COP30 is different from all previous COPs, and future COPs will rather follow the character of COP30. The reason is simple: UN climate negotiations have gone from negotiating rules, to actually having to deal with the substance of mitigating and adapting to climate change.

Shortly after the UN Framework Convention on climate change was established in the early 1990s, negotiations on a more detailed agreement began. In 1997, the Kyoto protocol was agreed after intense negotiations. In the years to follow the detailed rules of the Kyoto protocol were ironed out, not least the contentious issue of compliance – the rules of how to punish those countries who did not comply with the protocol.

Immediately after the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005(!), it was obvious that the protocol was not enough to adequately reduce emissions on a global scale. Not only did the emissions reductions obligations only apply to industrialised countries, but the biggest emitter at the time – the USA - was not even part of the protocol. This led to the Bali Roadmap in 2007, laying the ground for a new global treaty to be agreed at COP15 in Copenhagen 2009 – which famously and massively failed to do so.

It took a couple of years for the negotiations to recover and for countries to find the faith and willingness to continue, but the kickstart that COP17 in Durban provided meant that negotiations for a new set of rules were underway for the third time. This time it was clear that the top down model of both Kyoto and the failed attempt in Copenhagen was not going to work, leading to negotiations of a hybrid type of treaty, mainly based on a bottom up approach (the most famous component being the NDCs, which are at the center of attention at COP30).

The years leading up to the Paris agreement in 2015 were intense with not only the annual COPs and the intersessionals in Bonn, but also a number of extra climate negotiations taking place in for example Bangkok and Barcelona – all about how to construct a globally applicable agreement. After the success at COP21 in Paris, the hard work of once again ironing out the details began (in what layout of Excel tables should countries report emissions? how can carbon credits be traded?). 

At COP24 in Katowice, the “Paris Rulebook” was finally agreed, with the exception of how to organize carbon markets. A few other constructions of the Paris Agreement remained, with the last major one being agreed at COP29 in Baku last year: the new climate finance goal. 

With principally all rules, constructions and institutions of the Paris Agreement in place – the indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation being a notable exception, scheduled to be agreed in Belém – the climate negotiations now have to deal with the real stuff: How much are the emissions going to be reduced? By whom? And how fast? How much will that cost? Who should provide that money, from which sources, and to whom? Same thing for adaptation measures, which need to be implemented – how can that be done and who is paying for it?

None of these questions is on the formal agenda for COP30. 

Not only governments coming to Belém have expectations of these questions being addressed, but – rightfully – so have citizens around the world.

These fundamental questions require answers that neither the UNFCCC secretariat, nor most of the institutions, bodies and functions which have been set up under the climate convention and under the Paris agreement are designed to deal with. Likewise, many negotiators, and observers for that matter, are specialised in the negotiations of texts of rules of treaties, and not so much in the actual substance. 

Then there is the issue of mandates. Agreeing to frameworks and rules is one thing, committing to reducing a certain number of tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions or providing a certain number of euros is a whole other story. No country will send a delegation to a COP equipped with a mandate to agree on far reaching commitments of emissions reductions or funding – not least because those need the approval of ministers traditionally not present at COPs: Finance, Energy and Enterprise, to name just a few. 

This means that COPs alone cannot fully solve the core questions at hand, which is not yet fully recognized. What used to be fair expectations of what a COP could deliver, now often turns into a misaligned set of expectations and results. The substance of mitigation and finance commitments can however be handled plurilaterally and in smaller groups of countries, which then can be incorporated in the “Action Agenda” – the part of the UNFCCC which also includes non-state actors (both private and public) and their climate action. At the same time, other groups and associations (for example BRICS, and to a lesser extent G7 and G20), not least regional (ASEAN for example) can play a bigger role outside of COPs.

COPs, UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement however still have immense value. As democratic platforms under the UN, where every country on earth has a voice, they also provide smaller countries, which otherwise will not have a stage, with the possibility to express their situation, their needs and their proposals. That the decision-making in these spaces is consensus based both mean that otherwise marginalized groups and countries will have a say, and that it is increasingly difficult to reach meaningful decisions. 

Another fundamental function and value of COPs are their function as spaces for cooperation. That countries are able to meet, talk and better understand each other, is a crucial component of the international cooperation needed to tackle the climate crisis. 

COPs can also evolve and shift focus to functions that are increasingly needed. Accountability is at the top of the list, closely followed by implementation best practice exchange. The neutrality and global coverage make COPs ideal platforms for rather checking than agreeing on climate action. The Paris agreement brought a new set of reporting structures, still in their infancy – here, the potential for further development of what to do with those reports is huge.

COPs as we know them are a thing of the past, COPs in the era of implementation are still looking for their best function.

Data for the blog post

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Permalink: https://www.germanwatch.org/en/node/93339