Time for a Europe Capable of Action

The European Union and peace – more than a historical achievement

The European Union is not a technocratic project, but first and foremost a vision of politics and peace. It arose from the realisation that the old patterns of power politics, national humiliation, and economic isolation had repeatedly led Europe into war. The Frenchman Jean Monnet described the central dilemma of the post-war period as follows: ‘Every solution required a change in conditions: for the Germans, the humiliation caused by our control, for which there was no end in sight; and for the French, the fear of a Germany that was ultimately uncontrolled.’

There were three key responses to this: firstly, negotiations should be conducted on an equal footing and should not lead to the humiliation of the (temporarily) weaker party. Secondly, common interests should replace confrontation. The European Coal and Steel Community linked the interests of the six founding nations in precisely those industries that had previously served arms production and warfare. And thirdly, institutions should be established to safeguard human rights, the separation of powers, and lasting peace.

This approach was based on a simple but effective principle: those who are closely intertwined economically, politically, and legally do not wage war against each other. This logic continues to shape the EU to this day. It gave rise to institutions that limit power rather than concentrate it: independent courts, binding rules, shared sovereignty. Europe became a space where conflicts are resolved not militarily but legally and politically. The success is impressive. Since 1990, there have been no wars or civil wars in any of the countries that have joined the EU or entered into close contractual relations with it – a total of 33 countries to date. The only exception, the civil war in Northern Ireland, which had been raging since the 1960s, was brought to an end in 1998 with the Good Friday Agreement, largely thanks to the EU’s influence from 1992 onwards. 

In contrast, all other European states have experienced wars or civil wars: Bosnia, Russia, Turkey, Croatia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Georgia, Albania, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Slovenia. ‘From 1990 to 2022 – even before the large-scale attack on Ukraine – wars and violence in Europe have led to more than 300,000 deaths and around 10 million people being forcibly displaced’ (cf. Gerald and Francesca Knaus, Welches Europa brauchen wir? [What kind of Europe do we need?], 2025, p. 52). No wonder, then, that the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for its commitment to peace, reconciliation, democracy, and human rights. 

Today, many people take peace in Europe for granted. However, it is sometimes forgotten that peace is not a natural state but the result of political decisions and institutional safeguards.

Human rights and the separation of powers: the foundation of peace and democracy

The European peace order rests on a normative foundation. The idea of universal human dignity has developed over centuries. The United States Declaration of Independence of 1776 stated for the first time that ‘all men are created equal’. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) set out a political programme based on freedom, equality, and the rule of law. After the German war of aggression and the unprecedented crimes committed under National Socialist rule, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. The European Convention on Human Rights followed in 1950, before the European Court of Human Rights was established as an institutional guarantee in 1959. Since then, every citizen has been able to take legal action in cases of human rights violations. This development marks a civilisational breakthrough: it is no longer the state that grants rights, but rights that limit the state.

However, human rights can remain ineffective if they are not protected by a functioning separation of powers. Democracy thrives on control – not only through elections but through a permanent system of checks and balances. In addition to the institutional separation of powers between the judiciary, legislature, and executive, a range of independent actors ‘control’ the government, ensuring that power remains limited in democracies: an effective opposition, free science, critical media, an open internet, and a vibrant civil society. This is why we see that the independence of the judiciary, media, science, and civil society is systematically undermined when authoritarian systems are established. 

The 1945 Charter of the United Nations was the first time that an absolute prohibition on wars of aggression was enshrined in international law. The law was intended to curb the power of the stronger party, at least to some extent. This system was later expanded: the protection of life’s ecological foundations, through the Paris Agreement or the Convention on Biological Diversity, was recognised as a shared but differentiated responsibility. International law combines global solidarity with historical responsibility. It is thus more than a set of rules – it is an attempt to tame power and enable global cooperation.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America – an open attack on a world order based on international law, human rights, democracy, and climate change mitigation

The latest National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) marks a clear break with this tradition and the rules-based international order. Under slogans such as ‘America First’ and ‘peace through strength’, the principle of ‘might makes right’ is openly propagated. Key elements, to name but a few, are the claim to control over the Western hemisphere, the division of the world into zones of influence, and the selective application of international law where it serves US interests. This includes exerting massive personal pressure on judges of the International Criminal Court – for example, after the arrest warrant issued against Benjamin Netanyahu for alleged war crimes in the Gaza conflict. The intention is to intimidate and to deliberately delegitimise an important instrument of international law enforcement.

The NSS focuses on prolonging the fossil fuel business model based on coal, oil, and gas, while the Trump administration simultaneously portrays the climate and biodiversity crisis as a ‘hoax’. Those who want to limit these security risks are portrayed as a security risk themselves. The US has announced its withdrawal from key international organisations (UNFCCC, IPCC, IRENA, etc.). Since Trump took office for the second time, it has been deliberately building alliances to undermine international climate and environmental policy: for example, at the UN Plastic Summit, the IMO Maritime Summit and, in part (acting from the outside), during the UN Climate Change Conference in Brazil. In the US National Security Strategy, energy dominance figures as a central element of economic security – this includes not only affordable energy but also the expansion of energy exports. With the attack on Venezuela and the war against Iran, the US appears, among other things, to be pursuing a plan to strengthen its dominance in global energy markets and gain greater control over global oil flows and prices.

Particularly controversial is the announcement that the US wants to bring ‘patriotic parties’ to power in large EU states (and the UK). It is noteworthy that Russia (and possibly China) have declared that they are pursuing the same goal. The common goal is therefore to bring parties to power that attack key achievements such as human rights, an independent judiciary, science, the media, and civil society, while at the same time undermining the EU’s ability to act. The positive news for EU citizens is that all these authoritarian actors fear an EU that has the capacity to act and international influence.

The Trump administration’s alliance with the super-rich and the most powerful tech companies makes this fight against a democratic EU even more dangerous. The US National Security Strategy announces its intention to politically protect business models that poison democratic discourse through algorithmic amplification of hate and disinformation. It is not the perpetrators who are sanctioned, but those who attempt to defend democratic spaces. Personal sanctions have already been imposed on the managing directors of HateAid and members of the EU Commission, among others.

At the same time, the central element of European security, the military protective shield, is being called into question. The new position regarding Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the threats against NATO partner Greenland raise doubts about the reliability of the US’s mutual defence commitment (Article 5 of the NATO Treaty). Meanwhile, Russia is massively rearming, with around 40 per cent of the Russian state budget now being spent on armaments. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warns of a growing threat of war in Europe between 2027 and 2031.

The EU’s internal capacity to act: New EU independence to ensure peace and security for its citizens

In a democracy, citizens’ freedom rests on two pillars: the personal freedoms of the individual and the capacity of governments to act for the good of their people. In times of fundamental upheaval, the window for fundamental change opens. In a world order that is being reorganised, the EU needs to surpass itself and act independently. Whether it succeeds in doing so will determine whether the EU remains the sovereign architect of its future and creates prosperity and security for its citizens – or whether it becomes a playground for the hegemonic ambitions of others.

A key factor in this context is that the EU economy, which is heavily dependent on energy, must import more than half of its energy requirements (58% in 2023). As the largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil, the US is a key energy partner for the EU. With the trade agreement on energy imports announced by the EU and the United States in 2025, energy imports from the US could continue to rise in the coming years. However, on 23 February, following a tariff ruling in the US and new tariff announcements by the US government, the European Parliament formally put the implementation of the agreement on hold. And following the massive rise in oil and gas prices caused by the war on Iran initiated by the US and Israel, there is at least a push within the EU to significantly accelerate efforts to free itself from dependence on oil and gas. 

The EU’s capacity to act begins at home. Democracy thrives on trust in the state’s capacity to act. Three preliminary remarks on this: 

• First, energy, climate, and economic security can no longer be considered separately, but must be thought of as a closely linked ‘security triad’. 
• Second, the principle of human security should guide the further development of the European security architecture. It includes not only military aspects but also the protection of people, livelihoods, and social resilience.
• Third, it is very relevant to peace policy that international climate change mitigation and risk prevention can only succeed through cooperation and common rules for competition, not through confrontation.

The following steps should be taken to ensure the EU’s capacity to act:

• Energy and raw material dependencies are increasingly being used as geopolitical weapons, as can be seen, for example, in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the strategic realignment of the US, and Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz in response to the US attack (almost a fifth of global oil trade and around a fifth of global LNG trade, mainly from Qatar, passes through the strait). This shows that renewable energy and a comprehensive circular economy are much more than just climate policy instruments. They also offer additional security. Rapidly reducing oil and gas consumption through electrification, the expansion of renewable energy, and a consistent circular economy also means reducing political vulnerability to blackmail through energy and raw materials. As Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has said, it is now essential to ‘create a new form of European independence’, whether in terms of energy, raw materials, defence, or digital technology. This needs to be implemented quickly and decisively.
   
• Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which has been ongoing since 2022, has already highlighted the EU’s heavy reliance on fossil fuels from Russia. In response, the EU swiftly put together a plan of action – ‘REPowerEU’ – to regain energy sovereignty. In the current geopolitical situation, a similar reaction is urgently needed. It would now be appropriate to press ahead swiftly with the EU’s repeatedly postponed ‘Electrification Action Plan’ (an action plan to transition final energy consumption from fossil fuels to electricity in all Member States) and to underpin it with legislative measures.
   
• Economic stability, in turn, is a prerequisite for domestic political action. However, it cannot be achieved without sustainable business models, energy policy resilience, diversified supply chains, and a reduction in dependencies on autocratic systems. A resource-efficient circular economy not only reduces environmental pollution but also strengthens Europe’s economic resilience through secure supply chains and new green, human rights-oriented corridors. In view of crumbling infrastructure and constant train delays, pressure on health, care, and pension systems, rising living costs, and delayed investment in necessary ecological restructuring, there is an urgent need for a state capable of action – right down to local authorities.
   
• Climate change itself is one of the greatest security challenges of our time. At present, the European security architecture is still heavily focused on traditional military threats and crisis response. Climate risks are often treated like environmental or development issues instead of being systematically integrated into security policy analyses as a growing challenge to human and economic security. Many of the biggest geopolitical challenges of the past 15 years have had at least one climate-related dimension: the Arab Spring, the war in Syria, the destabilisation of Pakistan and the Sahel region exacerbated by extreme weather events, or the new geopolitical struggle over Greenland. Climate-related extreme events destroy livelihoods and kill people, while increasing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and supply chains, for example through flooding. They act as a risk multiplier for social tensions and violent conflicts – especially in fragile states. Competition for water and fertile land is increasing, while state capacities for crisis management are coming under pressure.  Moreover, species extinction leads to crop failures, water shortages, extreme weather, and diseases – with direct consequences for all economies. Fundamental changes or even the collapse of the Amazon, Congo, boreal forests, Himalayas, coral reefs, or mangroves – triggered by climate change and other factors – could jeopardise global security through global chain reactions. In the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report, environmental risks (extreme weather events, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, and critical changes to Earth’s systems) are identified as the three greatest risks over a ten-year horizon.
   
• At the same time, the climate crisis is a key geopolitical factor: the global race for green technologies, critical raw materials, and resilient supply chains is shifting power relations, creating new dependencies and lines of conflict but also opportunities and potential for cooperation. The climate crisis clearly demonstrates humanity’s interdependence. A key opportunity now lies in making this interdependence the basis for a new form of cooperation between South and North on an equal footing. 
   
• Autonomy and the capacity to act require not only political coordination, but also a coordinated European financial architecture such as the EU budget, as well as joint debt instruments and investment funds. Adequate funding is the foundation for investment in green technologies, in measures to reduce energy dependency (including through electrification, charging infrastructure, renewable energy, digitalisation, grids, storage), and in civil and military security.

Economic and energy security can no longer be separated from climate security. Stability in times of escalating climate risks depends on rapid decarbonisation, fair and conflict-sensitive transformation processes, and people-centred approaches to climate adaptation. It is precisely here – in shaping this process of value creation – that the opportunity lies to build new, future-oriented economic structures.

The triad of escalating climate crisis (climate security), accelerating disruptions (energy and raw material security), and opportunities and risks of economic transformation (economic security) laid the foundation for the last German government to consider dealing with climate change as part of the operating system of modern foreign and economic policy. 

The EU’s external capacity to act:  The future of multilateral cooperation on equal terms in a fragmented world order

The EU’s capacity to act internally forms the basis for its capacity to act in foreign policy. Now that the US government has withdrawn from the international order, or at least moved to its margins, many eyes are turning to Europe. Will the EU reach out to its partners around the world to collectively defend a rules-based world order guided by international law and human rights? Its strategic interests are not yet clearly defined. For many, the asymmetrical trade deal with the US government, especially the LNG part, seemed like a renunciation of principles.

The changing world order also gives the EU the opportunity to address its own blind spots. In his remarkable speech in Davos in January 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, referencing Václav Havel, said that ‘living within a lie’ was no longer possible: 

‘We knew the story of the international rules-based order was partially false – that the strongest would exempt themselves when convenient, that trade rules were enforced asymmetrically. And we knew that international law applied with varying rigour depending on the identity of the accused or the victim. This fiction was useful, and American hegemony, in particular, helped provide public goods, open sea lanes, a stable financial system, collective security and support for frameworks for resolving disputes. (…) But more recently, great powers have begun using economic integration as weapons, tariffs as leverage, financial infrastructure as coercion, supply chains as vulnerabilities to be exploited. You cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination.’

Carney warns against instinctively retreating into one’s own fortress and building higher walls: ‘Collective investments in resilience are cheaper than everyone building their own fortresses. Shared standards reduce fragmentations. Complementarities are positive sum. And the question for middle powers like Canada is not whether to adapt to the new reality – we must. The question is whether we adapt by simply building higher walls, or whether we can do something more ambitious.’

Is the EU ready to finally promote socially and ecologically embedded globalisation through state alliances? Is it ready to offer its partners in the Global South serious negotiations on an equal footing in order to take pragmatic but substantial steps towards overcoming the existing asymmetries in trade and international law structures? And is it willing to engage in genuine cooperation to reduce the massive gap between rich and poor that has grown in most countries and to ensure that international law is not applied with double standards?

In doing so, we should not forget the principles that have guided the EU’s successful gradual development: negotiating on an equal footing, intertwining interests, and securing cooperation through value- and rule-based institutions. 

The two levels of the new multilateralism

Climate and energy foreign policy will be used here as an example to show that the situation requires a two-pronged approach to multilateral cooperation.

The first level: protecting and gradually developing multilateral achievements

Firstly, the multilateral rules that have been painstakingly achieved through global consensus must be preserved, fairly implemented, and further developed. For example, the UN climate summits must remain a ‘big tent’ in which every nation – including the most vulnerable – has a voice. This framework, which ensures legitimacy, universality, legal clarity, and collective orientation, remains indispensable and irreplaceable. 

In an increasingly fragmented world, the focus should now be on intelligently advancing the second Global Stocktake (2028–2030). It should highlight the momentum and significant implementation gaps regarding the three Paris goals – temperature limits, adaptation targets, and the necessary redirection of financial flows – and serve as a basis for further action. This should reveal which states have violated international law and which countries or alliances are making significant progress in climate change mitigation and adaptation. The International Court of Justice’s new guidelines on state responsibility regarding climate change mitigation provide a supreme court interpretation of international law for this purpose. At the same time, initiatives should be taken to reform key institutions such as the UNFCCC processes and the UN Security Council – even if, in view of geopolitical blockades, only gradual progress is possible at first.

The second level: Agile pioneering alliances

Secondly, targeted pioneering alliances are needed for specific policy areas. Consensus-based decisions are difficult to achieve under the umbrella of the UNFCCC, and even consensus-oriented club formats such as the G7 and G20 currently have only a limited capacity to act. The Brazilian COP President Da Lago, who will remain in office until November 2027, therefore proposes supplementing multilateralism with a second level that operates with significantly higher institutional speed. This level should focus on the implementation of multilaterally agreed rules in variable coalitions. This is compatible with the Paris Agreement: although the rules are decided by global consensus, their implementation is the responsibility of the nation states. 

These open coalitions should make it possible to mobilise and deploy resources, implement solutions cooperatively, use new mechanisms, and enable learning on a large scale – without calling into question the collectively agreed rules. Da Lago is counting on actors to strategically combine finance, technology, and capacity building with policy-making in order to achieve exponential change and cascade effects in all sectors – the so-called ‘positive tipping points’.

The common goal of these South-North pioneering alliances – both within and outside the UN framework – remains the implementation of the Paris Agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), international law, and human rights. However, it is important that Germany and the EU continue to strengthen their credibility with their partner countries and build trust. This includes the provision of financial resources. It is important to report regularly on progress in order to ensure transparency and accountability and to inspire others. Where possible, think tanks and civil society actors from the countries involved should also be included in these initiatives – this would strengthen both the alliances and civil society itself. 

Some notes on areas of cooperation

The interests of the participating countries should be intertwined in a fair manner on several levels:

• through significantly fairer cooperation along the value chains of industries of the future
• through cooperation between countries that are still heavily dependent on oil and gas today, in order to rapidly reduce this dependence together. The implementation of the roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels (TAFF) launched at COP30 in Brazil offers a good starting point for this cooperation.
• through transformation partnerships with exporting countries that want to change their fossil fuel business model and participate in the value creation for future industries
• through alliances to strengthen resilience (referred to in the UN climate negotiations as ‘adaptation’ and ‘loss and damage’), especially in highly vulnerable and fragile states 
• and through initiatives to generate new and additional funds for necessary climate finance. Examples include the Global Solidarities Levies Taskforce, which aims to introduce levies based on the ‘polluter pays principle’ (which states that the costs of environmental or health damage must be borne by those who caused it), as well as debt relief initiatives for critically indebted countries
   

Some pointers for reorienting relations with important countries or country groups

Reorganisation of relations with the US

Despite the challenges posed by the Trump regime, the EU should examine where common interests with the US still exist. For example, it should be examined whether and to what extent common interests exist with regard to access to critical raw materials. At the same time, the EU must consistently minimise the massively increased risks in areas where blackmail poses a threat. US tactics involving economic and political coercion are on the rise, even towards NATO partners. Experience with Trump to date shows that giving in is not worthwhile. 

However, much greater opportunities for cooperation are opening up with subnational actors in the US: many US states and cities are pushing ahead with ambitious climate and industrial policies. Initiatives such as America Is All In – referring to the Paris Agreement – represent over 160 million people and an economic output of around ten trillion dollars. Even in Republican-governed states, renewable energy is expanding strongly – the market is trumping ideology here.

Non-naive climate cooperation with China

China is a key trading partner for the EU, a leader in strategic minerals, a dominant player in electromobility, and the largest emitter of greenhouse gases (in absolute terms). Without China, limiting global warming to below 2°C is impossible, and reducing emissions in China will be a decisive factor in determining whether we can avoid tipping points and irreversible consequences of rising temperatures. Former state secretary Jennifer Morgan proposes a strategic agreement with China in the spirit of a non-naive intertwining of interests: on the one hand, it could protect the EU as a business location by preventing the desired (especially digital) imports from China from being misused for control purposes, and on the other hand, it could advance the global energy transition through targeted cooperation. The EU could offer China stable investment and trade relations in return for a verifiable security of supply, data sovereignty, fair market access for the EU, and a binding commitment by China to phase out coal and methane.

EU-BASIC Alliance

The EU and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) are arguably the two groups that, by working together, would have the political and diplomatic clout to restore stability and trust in the multilateral framework with a high degree of probability. At the same time, it is a challenge to constructively align political and economic interests that seem to be, in some cases, contradictory. COP30 in Belém highlighted these tensions. However, both groups are strong supporters of multilateralism, share the goal of curbing climate change, and are essentially committed to a transformation towards an electrified, renewable energy-based economy (see Non-Paper, EU climate diplomacy reset: a three-year plan, 2026).

Cooperation with small and, above all, vulnerable partner countries

Of course, it is equally crucial to build an effective coalition with smaller and particularly vulnerable countries. It is worth considering that the High Ambition Coalition did not cooperate as effectively as usual with these countries at COP30 in Brazil. An alliance with vulnerable states would enable them, together with progressive middle powers from the South and North, to secure ‘moral supremacy’ in the climate debate. To this end, options for joint action must be prepared throughout the year – both with the small island states, the 74 particularly vulnerable countries of the V20, the least developed countries, and partner countries from Africa and Latin America. Incidentally, such effective cooperation in the areas of climate change mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage also creates an important basis for Germany to receive support from a sufficient number of countries to regain a seat on the UN Security Council in 2027.

In all these collaborations, strategic attention should be paid to strengthening the checks and balances that most effectively counteract authoritarian tendencies. These include the independence of opposition parties, the judiciary (which is currently a key driver of the climate and biodiversity debate worldwide), science, the media, internet sovereignty, and a vibrant civil society. Almost all human rights have been fought for by civil society movements – from the abolition of slavery to women’s suffrage and the codification of climate change mitigation as a constitutional principle.

What can each individual do?

The necessary change can also be initiated through individual action. Each of us can increase our own ‘handprint’ of effective engagement in our own way – whether at school, university, work, or in our own community. Let us hope that protests will soon return to the streets in support of new European independence, the rapid phase-out of oil and gas, the local expansion of renewable energy, and digital sovereignty.

Now is the time for all of us to show how we want to live together in Germany, the EU, and the world.

Thanks to Lalit Chennamaneni, Charly Heberer, Lisa Schultheiß, Rixa Schwarz, and Ute Sudmann for their input and feedback on the EU’s internal and external capacity to act.