1. The big picture
COP30 proved to be a magnifying glass for the global struggle over international climate policy. Promising initial momentum was followed by bitter obstruction by a few, but relevant, countries which prevented urgently needed decisions. Despite some isolated progress, the results fell short of the required action. There remains a wide gap between what is absolutely necessary and what is currently politically feasible. It was the first COP since the International Court of Justice clearly defined states’ climate obligations – but much remains to be done to ensure that the international community lives up to these obligations.
Two fundamental problems are hampering global climate policy. On the one hand, a bloc of states has formed around the US, now the largest oil-producing country, and often in coordination with Russia and sometimes Saudi Arabia, doing everything it can to prolong the fossil fuel business model, undermining democracy and civil society in the process. Their fossil fuel business model is under structural pressure for the first time since the beginning of industrialisation due to the massive increase in investment in renewable energies and the ongoing electrification process.
On the other hand, in more and more countries, the very wealthy only pay for their own infrastructure and are increasingly unwilling to pay taxes to support poorer sections of the population in their own country – let alone internationally. This puts enormous pressure on the jointly agreed efforts to reduce global poverty and protect the environment (Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs) as well as international climate financing, which is contributing to further indebtedness of poor countries.
However, further acceleration of the global energy transition is urgently needed: the world has already exceeded the dangerous 1.5°C threshold, at least for a few decades. The new climate targets submitted by countries ahead of COP30 are not sufficient to generate the necessary acceleration in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, industrialised countries’ public budgets for international climate action and development aid are shrinking. This made it all the more gratifying that, in the first nine days of the climate summit, there was strong momentum to agree on a roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels within the next two years. However, the summit ended without a binding agreement.
Around 90 countries had already signed up, and many countries from the group of least developed countries (LDCs) wanted to follow suit. However, the interplay of two fundamental problems prevented the necessary outcome. The EU’s inability to act, given reduced climate budgets, significantly damaged its credibility in building alliances. At the same time, an alliance led by Saudi Arabia and Russia – this time also supported by China, India, and Nigeria – blocked any clear mention of phasing out fossil fuels in the final text. After its dynamic start, the COP also suffered from a lack of transparency and procedural problems caused by a Brazilian Presidency that suddenly lost its assertiveness.
The key question following this climate summit is now: how can the EU gain the necessary capacity to act – backed by sufficient financial resources – to build effective South-North alliances throughout the year that translate the momentum visible during the COP into an accelerated phase-out of fossil fuels and greater adaptation? Any acceleration in the expansion of renewable energy and electrification also reduces the revenues of the fossil fuel bloc.
The establishment of CO2 pricing mechanisms in more and more countries, sometimes triggered by the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), provides an important platform for international cooperation. How can the polluter pays principle finally be implemented consistently both at national and international level? Following the legal impetus provided by the International Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the important ruling of the Higher Regional Court of Hamm against RWE, there is a new basis for such approaches.
After three COPs in authoritarian states, it was very refreshing to feel the tailwind provided by a vibrant civil society and many indigenous groups in Belém. It is also important that the final declaration of the G20, published when the COP came to a close, supports the acceleration of the global energy transition, increased disaster preparedness, the restructuring of food systems, and the slowing down of deforestation – albeit without the US and Argentina.
The tug of war continues after this summit of stalled momentum. 80% of people worldwide want their governments to take stronger action against climate change. At the same time, the growing competitiveness of future technologies and, increasingly, the courts are generating positive momentum. Commitment – whether on the streets, through future-oriented companies, in court, or in politics – is more important than ever.
2. Outcomes on negotiated items
2.1. Ambition
A key expectation for the ‘COP of truth’ was to recognise the existing ambition gap and to chart credible pathways forward to close it. Collectively, countries’ old and new national climate targets (Nationally Determined Contributions, NDCs) fall far short of the rapid emissions reductions that are necessary, as the Paris benchmark of 1.5°C is drifting further out of reach. With a critical decade of implementation ahead, the conference was meant to send a strong signal of global determination to correct course. After contentious negotiations, the COP outcome is too weak to inspire such optimism although some elements could lead to progress.
The cover decision was the place for Parties to make the strongest collective call for greater ambition and to reaffirm their commitment to the multilateral process and international cooperation. Consultations led by the Presidency cumulated in the ‘Mutirão decision’, a two-week effort to provide a space for contentious issues including finance, trade policies, and the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C goal. While the Presidency was initially reluctant to officially support any cover decision, it shifted gear and began to exert increasing time pressure on Parties to agree to a text. Meanwhile, consultations became gradually inaccessible to observers with little text trickling down – a stain on the Presidency and the spirit of togetherness it had proclaimed.
The Mutirão decision rightly acknowledges the progress made in the 10 years since the Paris Agreement was signed – an achievement graphically underpinned by the updated UN Synthesis Report released during the COP, highlighting an anticipated 12% drop in global emissions compared to 2019 levels by 2035. Crucially, the decision also calls on Parties ‘to do better’ in implementation and, where possible, in updating and overachieving their NDCs as early as possible. Moreover, Parties including Mexico, Bhutan, and Iraq submitted their NDCs during the conference.
However, the Mutirão decision does not adequately recognise the prevailing ambition gap. While the third generation of NDCs does substantially better than previous ones, it still fails to keep 1.5°C within reach. Tellingly, the final text does not include any direct reference to fossil fuels, by far the largest source of emissions globally, and as such fails to live up to the urgency of the climate crisis. COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago himself acknowledged during the closing plenary that some of the delegates ‘had greater ambitions’. Moreover, the decision only hints at a path towards more ambitious targets and accelerated implementation. Without the Global North moving on stepping up ambition and paying off its climate debt more quickly, emerging economies in particular remained reluctant to commit to higher ambition.
Instead of creating sturdy bridges to cross this entrenched divide, COP30 has launched two yet ill-defined mechanisms, the ‘Global Implementation Accelerator’ and the ‘Belém Mission to 1.5’ alongside two roadmaps formally outside of the COP process – on transitioning away from fossil fuels and on deforestation. It will be imperative to follow up, sharpen, and expand on these new instruments. In addition, the lacklustre outcome of COP30 highlights the need especially for the EU and Germany to intensify efforts to re-build trust with hesitant partners from the Global South. This means forging strategic long-term high-impact coalitions that acknowledge domestic realities, provide substantial support, and will create momentum for tangible multilateral action to close the ambition gap.
2.2. Climate adaptation
COP30 delivered incremental progress on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), offering several stepping-stones towards enhancing adaptation efforts, but ultimately fell short of the major leap toward implementation that many had hoped for. Although the conference was widely announced as an ‘Adaptation COP,’ adaptation received insufficient political attention, a lack of prioritisation that is reflected in the outcome’s overall substance.
The Adaptation Package adopted at COP30 covers necessary elements such as indicators, finance, and aspects of implementation, yet none of these components reached the level of ambition or clarity that would have been possible. After intense and complex negotiations, Parties adopted 59 of the 100 planned indicators. This list, however, requires substantial refinement and additions, which are now spread across multiple – sometimes overlapping – processes, including the Belém–Addis Vision for policy alignment. While the inclusion of Means of Implementation (MoI) indicators can be seen as a positive step, the indicators are political, incomplete, and difficult to track overall. They resulted from a rushed political streamlining of the experts’ technical work. Thematically, they cross some of the red lines that countries have formulated, and the two-year alignment process they trigger remains poorly defined. Moreover, the list is expected to undergo revision after the second Global Stocktake (GST2).
Despite years of technical effort to produce a scientifically robust proposal, the final list of indicators is neither scientifically sound nor comprehensive, as not all sub-targets are covered. In fact, the technical indicators’ poorly facilitated and non-transparent absorption into the political COP decision resulted in contradictory signals from Parties – adopting the list while at the same time indicating that the indicators may not necessarily be used in their current form. This concession catered particularly to the concerns of the Latin American and Caribbean states of the SUR group, which resisted adoption due to an opaque negotiation process that produced no text in the final days. Many questioned what ultimately shifted the African Group of Negotiators’ (AGN) position to resist adoption, but it appears that the expert-generated list was largely treated as a knowledge resource, with adoption not translating into obligations and several contentious indicators being removed.
A more positive development was the establishment of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, now recognised as the UNFCCC’s main implementation tool for adaptation and a mechanism to streamline the broader adaptation architecture. While the Roadmap addresses some unresolved issues carried over from Dubai, a number of open questions remain.
Overall, COP30 has advanced the adaptation agenda, but the outcome reflects compromise rather than ambition – progress, yes, but far from the breakthrough needed to accelerate global adaptation. At the SB64 in Bonn in 2026, Parties will have to continue working on the indicators and the Baku Adaptation Roadmap, addressing the open questions that Belém left us with.
2.3. Climate finance
At COP30, some progress was achieved on adaptation finance. In the Mutirão decision, Parties agreed on a new target to triple adaptation finance by 2035, but they did not refer to the GGA. This outcome falls short of what the countries most vulnerable to climate impacts had identified as necessary and provides only a cautious signal regarding a future adaptation finance target, without clearly assigning responsibility for its delivery. Prior to COP30, least developed countries had called for ‘a tripling of grant-based adaptation finance by 2030 to at least USD 120 billion.’ In contrast, the Belém decision extends the timeline to 2035, leaves the reference year for the tripling undefined, and does not specify which countries are expected to contribute. This ambiguity has already led to widely diverging interpretations, highlighting the difficulty of implementing and tracking the tripling target. The negotiation dynamics in the second week help explain this result: the new adaptation finance target became increasingly entangled with bargaining over a possible Transition Away from Fossil Fuels (TAFF). Frustration with the EU’s negotiating conduct on adaptation finance built up among several Parties that felt that the AGN and LDCs were being positioned as blockers on the TAFF process – leading to lower EU flexibility on adaptation finance and resulting in weak outcomes overall.
Although the new adaptation finance goal and the TAFF are equally important, this partly cannibalising dynamic narrowed the political space for a more robust and unambiguous adaptation finance outcome and pushed substantive discussions into late-night, closed-door settings. It is, however, important that the decision provides for a continuous ramp-up of funds, which should increase pressure on wealthy countries to act. The commitment to triple adaptation funding through multilateral climate funds was also included in the final decision. Still, pledges made by industrialised countries for the Adaptation Fund – and by all wealthy countries for the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage – fell far short of what is needed, adding to widespread disappointment. Equally concerning was the cancellation of the GEF–LDCF pledging session for the second consecutive year due to a lack of indications from donor countries that even the modest floor of USD 3 million would be met.
To mobilise adequate international climate finance in the future, countries such as Germany and EU Member States should introduce additional levies that reflect the polluter pays principle. Those who cause the most damage must bear the costs. Otherwise, progress in other areas will remain elusive. The failure to agree on a TAFF is a striking example.
Significant commitments were only made for the Tropical Forest Fund (TFFF) launched by Brazil outside the official negotiations. The TFFF is a multilateral investment fund aiming to generate new funding from both public and private investors for tropical forest conservation. After emerging economies such as Brazil and Indonesia announced multi-billion-dollar pledges in the weeks leading up to the COP, Norway, France, and – shortly after Chancellor Merz’s controversial remarks about the host country – Germany followed suit during the conference.
In the run-up to COP 30, expectations were high for the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap, which was meant to outline how the USD 1.3 trillion stipulated under the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) could be mobilised by 2035. The Roadmap, presented on 5 November 2025, just a few days before the COP, proposes a fairly balanced plan for raising the required funds, drawing on a wide range of actors and pathways and including fairer mechanisms such as direct budget support and wealth taxes. But by aiming for such a high amount, the Roadmap risks diluting the core justice principles and the emphasis on grant-based support essential for climate adaptation and for addressing loss and damage. This is especially evident in efforts to redirect public and international climate finance in order to leverage private investment – an approach that could make funding less equitable and harder to access. Moreover, many of the actions identified in the Roadmap emphasise transparency (i.e. in the delivery of climate finance by Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)), reporting, dialogue, coordination across the whole landscape of financial actors, and assessments rather than concrete steps towards scaling-up finance. Due to its late release, the Roadmap received little attention at COP30 and was only ‘taken note of.’ The sole decision was to hold a high-level ministerial roundtable to ‘reflect’ on NCQG implementation, without a timeline. A binding implementation plan was omitted. Going forward, progress will depend on voluntary coalitions of willing countries and the circle of finance ministers that Brazil intends to advance alongside the existing Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action.
Noteworthy are the new negotiation and dialogue formats for Article 9 and Article 2.1(c) In the run-up to the COP, concerns emerged about a potential agenda dispute triggered by Article 9.1, which affirms the responsibility of developed countries to provide climate finance. The Brazilian COP Presidency succeeded in avoiding this conflict. The final document establishes a two-year work programme addressing all of Article 9, meaning that tensions and uncertainty surrounding Article 9.1 will persist for the time being. The importance of Article 2.1(c), which aims to align all financial flows with pathways towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development, was reaffirmed. Work on the implementation of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement will continue until 2028 under the newly created ‘Veredas Dialogue’. This process will be accompanied by an annual high-level roundtable (labelled ‘Xingu Finance Talks’), intended to support constructive exchanges among Parties and non-Party stakeholders.
2.4. Just Transition
As one of the few negotiated items that resulted in a formal decision, the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) is widely seen as a significant outcome of the summit in Belém. The agreement to establish a Just Transition Mechanism (paragraph 25) marks a significant step forward and is strongly welcomed by Germanwatch.
At the same time, the mechanism is still in its early stages. It is yet to be operationalised, and essential tasks such as mapping relevant processes and institutions remain incomplete (paragraph 24). The next phase will depend heavily on submissions, since Parties and non-Party stakeholders are invited to contribute their ideas in the spirit of the Mutirão decision (paragraph 26).
The mechanism’s most important function will be to coordinate Just Transition efforts across countries and to facilitate the exchange of best practices from those already moving ahead. These efforts must be supported by concrete actions, including mobilising financial resources and providing direct support to countries implementing projects linked to Just Transition. Even if 70% of NDCs submitted in 2025 incorporate Just Transition principles, as noted in the NDC Synthesis Report, countries will still need an institutional arrangement that can assess both the pace of progress and the extent to which their transition pathways uphold Just Transition principles as defined by the JTWP decision and adapted to national circumstances and capabilities.
Several positive elements stand out in the JTWP decision. These include an explicit reference to the 1.5°C limit (paragraph 1) and the recognition of Indigenous Peoples throughout the text. The decision considers human rights and emphasises meaningful participation in the development of Just Transition pathways, as well as the need to include a broad range of affected groups. It is also important that the Just Transition envisioned in the decision is not confined to the energy sector but understood in a broader context that includes socioeconomic aspects and climate change adaptation.
Despite these advances, several omissions require attention. The decision does not include language on TAFF, even though it remains essential for any credible Just Transition pathway. References to critical minerals are also missing, despite their central role in the debates and in the broader global shift toward net zero. Gender language has been softened compared to earlier drafts, although the final text does not contain the footnote proposed by Paraguay that would have limited the understanding of gender to biological sex. A central section of the decision, paragraphs 12 and 13, merely invites Parties to consider the outcomes of the Just Transition dialogues when developing national pathways for Just Transition, and even these lists of things to consider have been shortened compared to previous versions.
The section on unilateral trade measures (UTMs) has been removed from the JTWP decision. This does not mean the issue has been resolved. Instead, it reappears elsewhere in the broader Belém Political Package and will continue to be discussed as part of a series of dialogues. These gaps underscore that substantial work remains to be done to ensure the JTWP and the Just Transition Mechanism can effectively support ambitious, inclusive, and scientifically sound transitions in the years ahead.
2.5. Mitigation
COP30 was anticipated with high expectations. As the endpoint of the first ambition cycle under the Paris Agreement, it was meant to translate the Global Stocktake into concrete action and restore the loss of momentum after COP29, where efforts to operationalise the Dubai outcomes collapsed over disagreements on fossil fuels and climate finance. Many countries arrived in Belém expecting COP30 to finally chart a path toward the implementation of the global energy goals set at COP28, with developed countries taking the lead.
At the beginning of the summit, a surprising energy was palpable. Nearly 90 countries from across different regions endorsed the idea of launching a two-year process to develop a global roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels. For a moment, it seemed as if COP30 might bring about the breakthrough that had eluded negotiators in recent years. But this momentum quickly faded as the talks ran into two familiar obstacles. Industrialised countries failed to make a credible offer for the necessary finance – especially for adaptation – amid shrinking climate and development budgets. This undermined their ability to build trust or alliances with countries that had repeatedly stressed that higher ambition requires real support. In the final hours, a strengthened coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia, and joined by China, India, and Nigeria, removed even the most basic references to a fossil-fuel transition from the final text.
As a result, COP30 fell far short of expectations. The Mutirão decision did not establish a process for developing a roadmap for the transition away from fossil fuels, nor did it respond adequately to the new NDCs’ insufficient ambition. Two initiatives – the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Belém Mission for 1.5°C – were launched. The voluntary Accelerator aims to help countries overcome the practical and policy obstacles that prevent them from meeting their climate targets, while the Belém Mission seeks to focus global political attention on the rapidly narrowing 1.5°C window. However, these initiatives can only make a difference if backed by meaningful finance and translated into targeted support for countries most affected by climate impacts. Otherwise, they risk becoming symbolic rather than transformative.
To move the process forward, progress now needs to come from outside the formal negotiations. Brazil will continue to press ahead with work on a fossil-fuel transition roadmap during its Presidency, and Colombia and the Netherlands will host the first international conference on a Just Transition away from fossil fuels. The EU and Germany should actively support these efforts. While such initiatives cannot replace a negotiated commitment, they can help create the political conditions necessary for one. At the same time, the EU and Germany must make a concerted effort to repair strained relationships with the Global South. Rebuilding trust will require long-term partnerships based on real finance, technology transfer, and hands-on implementation support – including cooperation with countries ready to develop transition roadmaps and accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.
All of this must pave the way for a breakthrough at COP31. There, countries must finally agree on a formal process to develop a global roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels – one with clear milestones, timelines, and fair differentiation in line with the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). The upcoming SB sessions, although lacking a dedicated agenda item, can help maintain momentum. Open information sessions on the Global Implementation Accelerator may provide an opening for political dialogue and may help keep the issue on the table. Equally important are the two Presidency reports expected at COP31: one on the Global Implementation Accelerator and one on the Belém Mission. These reports offer a crucial opportunity to bring the action-oriented initiatives launched in Belém back into the formal COP process. If a strategic approach is taken, the failure in Belém can be turned into a turning point, laying the foundation for the binding commitments the world urgently needs.
2.6. Loss and Damage
While attention focused on the Global Goal on Adaptation and the TAFF proposal, Loss and Damage (L&D) received limited attention. Negotiations on L&D centred mainly on the Fund responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) and the third review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), with little momentum beyond these items.
COP30 started strong for L&D with the launch of the Barbados Implementation Modalities and the first call for proposals, mobilising USD 250 million. This initial beacon of light was dimmed rather soon, as new pledges were nearly absent, with Spain’s USD 20 million being the only notable pledge. Parties adopted the 2025 FRLD report, providing guidance for the initial phase of the Fund, yet offering no direction on how to scale up or ensure reliable long-term support for vulnerable countries. Although Parties welcomed plans for a first replenishment in 2027, they provided no clarity on how this would be achieved. The absence of pledges and a replenishment strategy undermines the trust of Global South countries and leaves the Fund far from meeting needs projected at USD 290–690 billion by 2030, or the even higher estimates from civil society (447–894 billion).
Negotiations on the WIM review became unexpectedly contentious and lengthy. The Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) and others pushed to reference the ICJ Advisory Opinion, but the Arab Group opposed this, arguing the process should focus on cooperation rather than litigation. Its exclusion represents a missed opportunity to highlight legal obligations for Global North countries to provide L&D finance. Debates also emerged around the cost effectiveness of the Santiago Network Secretariat, the inclusion of human rights language, and the development of voluntary guidelines for integrating L&D into NDCs and national plans.
Parties did agree, however, to establish a multi-year L&D Status Quo Report, with terms of reference to be prepared by the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage (SNLD) Advisory Board. As it has produced the Gap Reports for Mitigation and Adaptation, UNEP should seek accreditation to the SNLD and apply for the preparation of the report. This would ensure that there is no overlap with the already existing adaptation gap report. According to the decision taken at COP30, the report shall ‘Synthesize information from Parties and other stakeholders on critical issues and lessons learned and providing best practices, solutions and policy advice’ on L&D. But the contentious issue of using the report to show the L&D finance gap seems unresolved as the mandate does not provide for the explicit integration of finance-related information. In addition, the report’s proposed outline looks more like a status report than a gap report showcasing where action is urgently needed.
With the WIM review concluded, no agenda item was dedicated to L&D at COP30. Going forward, it will appear only as part of institutional reports that may be adopted without negotiation, risking reduced political space and oversight. A permanent agenda item could help maintain attention and address emerging challenges such as the L&D Gap Report. Parties need to agree on setting up an agenda item at SB66.
2.7. Food systems/agriculture
The results of COP30 fell well short of the high expectations for advancing sustainable, low-emission, and climate-resilient food systems. This is especially notable given that the conference took place under the Lula administration, whose political priority is the fight against hunger.
No major breakthroughs or binding commitments emerged for transforming food systems. The Mutirão decision makes no reference to food systems; the GGA includes now only a few voluntary food systems indicators that were amended in a non-transparent manner and that were raising questions about how adaptation in food systems can be realistically measured. The Sharm El-Sheikh Joint Work on Agriculture (SSJWA) ended with procedural conclusions only, postponing all substantive decisions to the Bonn session (SB64 in June 2026). Although nearly all countries incorporated food systems into their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), effective policies addressing entire food systems remain largely absent.
Despite the Presidency’s Action Agenda highlighting agricultural transformation as one of six key priorities, only few notable initiatives emerged: the RAIZ initiative on regenerating degraded lands, primarily targeting the agricultural industry; the TERRA initiative promoting agroecology, developed without civil society participation; the Belém Fertilisers Declaration, which found very few supporters; and the addition of three new members to the Alliance of Champions for Food Systems Transformation. International financing for agri-food systems stays insufficient, though philanthropies encouragingly pledged up to USD 3 billion for agricultural innovation, smallholder farmers, and adaptation. On a positive note, 43 states and the EU signed the Belém Declaration on Hunger, Poverty, and People-Centered Climate Action, demanding stronger links between climate change mitigation and social justice while focusing on vulnerable populations.
As the SSJWA mandate ends in 2026, a priority for the upcoming year will be to debate and push forward the scope and ambition of food systems debates within the UNFCCC and beyond. It is now essential to derive ambitious measures for food systems from NDCs, despite their limited scope.
3. Non-negotiated items
3.1. Peoples’ Summit
The Peoples’ Summit, held in parallel to COP30, brought together around 20,000 participants from social movements, traditional communities, and Indigenous Peoples across Brazil and worldwide. It emphasised that climate justice and food sovereignty primarily require that basic rights – such as land tenure rights, the right to clean water, and access to adequate food – are guaranteed.
At the Peoples’ Summit, those impacted by the climate crisis and the associated political measures had a voice, were heard, and called for true climate justice. A central topic over the five days was food sovereignty; agroecology emerged as a practical, local solution to the climate crisis and food insecurity.
3.2. Germany’s contribution to the TFFF
The Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF) was officially launched in Belém. Germany has now clearly positioned itself by pledging EUR 1 billion over ten years. It is commendable that the German government views the TFFF not as an investment vehicle for returns, but as an instrument for forest protection. The form of participation, however, came as a surprise: instead of investive contributions through loans or guarantees – as initially expected – the funds will be provided as non-repayable budget resources by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Climate Action, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMUKN). Germany will provide around EUR 100 million per year over ten years – a noteworthy contribution that strengthens the TFFF but remains only a first step compared to the target volume of USD 25 billion in sponsor capital. With this pledge, Germany will likely secure a seat on the TFFF decision-making body, giving it the opportunity to actively shape the facility’s future development – particularly regarding transparency, risk management, and binding sustainability standards. However, it remains unclear whether the pledged funds will be provided in addition to existing climate finance budgets or whether they will replace resources from other funds. To ensure that the TFFF will succeed, it is crucial that Germany, once the framework conditions are in place, follows up with a second, investive funding round in the form of concessional loans. Only then can the TFFF fully realise its potential.
4. Outlook
COP30 has clearly demonstrated that the international climate process is at a turning point. If countries truly want to move from negotiation to action, a structural renewal of the UNFCCC is essential. Above all, the consensus principle is increasingly proving to be a major obstacle: despite clear support from over 90 countries, an ambitious outcome on phasing out fossil fuels was once again blocked by a small number of countries. Above all, the consensus principle is increasingly proving to be a major obstacle: despite clear support from over 90 countries, an ambitious outcome on phasing out fossil fuels was once again blocked by a few countries. If the UNFCCC does not change, it risks losing relevance at a time of escalating climate risks. Ten years after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the architecture of the process must evolve – away from negotiating ever new compromises, toward effective implementation, consistent monitoring, and robust accountability. However, such a realignment can only succeed through genuine reforms. This includes reviewing the decision-making rules, above all the consensus principle, as well as adjusting the negotiations’ frequency and formats to ensure that the process can lead to real action. Several countries – Latin American and Caribbean states in particular – have already introduced corresponding reform proposals and made it clear that political support for such reforms is growing.
However, we should not expect these problems to be solved within the framework of the UNFCCC, as changes can only be made by consensus – and have been blocked since 1992 by Saudi Arabia and several other states. At the UN General Assembly, in contrast, decisions can be taken by majority vote, which may provide a realistic course of action.
At the same time, countries must step up their national commitments. The recent clarifications by the International Court of Justice defined a clear framework: countries must now take responsibility in accordance with the polluter pays principle – for example, by introducing new taxes to mobilise funds for adaptation and for dealing with L&D.
After lengthy discussions, the next COP will take place in an unusual constellation: Turkey will assume the Presidency, while Australia will hold the newly created role of ‘Presidency of the Negotiations.’ This new structure could create many new points of friction, and the two countries must now organise quickly to create effective processes leading up to COP31.
