1. SB64 in context: Growing Climate Risks, Geopolitical Tensions and the Implementation Challenge
The Bonn Climate Change Conference (SB64) exposed a widening gap between the pace of international climate negotiations and the speed at which the climate crisis—and global energy transition are unfolding. While the transition to clean energy continues to speed up in many parts of the world, the negotiations have only advanced incrementally and remain politically contested on many core issues. As a result, SB64 failed to establish a sturdy enough foundation for a successful COP31.
The conference took place amid multiple overlapping crises. The ongoing energy crisis continues to reshape global energy markets while the related disruptions to fertiliser supply and agricultural production contribute to growing pressures on food security. The developing El Niño event, expected to intensify climate impacts and humanitarian needs in many vulnerable regions, is compounding these challenges. Meanwhile, climate change impacts continue to heighten worldwide. Global hunger has already risen substantially in the past 10 years. Moreover, prolonged disruptions to maritime trade via the Strait of Hormuz, combined with El Niño impacts, will likely place further pressure on global food systems in the coming months.
Paradoxically, these geopolitical disruptions have also accelerated structural changes in the global energy system. Energy market instability caused by the Middle East war has reinforced the economic case for renewable energy and electrification, contributing to one of the strongest periods of investment in clean energy since the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015. However, the Bonn negotiations did not demonstrate a level of political responsiveness commensurate with the rapidly changing realities.
This disconnect became apparent across many negotiating rooms. Discussions repeatedly stalled on procedural and political disputes, resulting in three agenda items closing without agreement.1 Bonn, thus, exposed the principal fault lines likely to shape negotiations at COP31. Climate finance emerged as the foremost source of political tension. Negotiations were constrained by growing concerns over several developed countries’ retrenchment of international climate finance. Limited progress was also made on adaptation.
While the United States completely backed up on its international climate finance commitments, other industrialised countries – potentially including Germany – appear they will reduce international climate finance, putting previously announced commitments at risk. This regression risks further eroding trust between negotiating groups just when predictable and scaled-up financial support is essential for progress in virtually every area of the Paris Agreement. There is still great uncertainty on two of the most important outstanding issues: increasing adaptation finance and agreeing on indicators for the Global Goal on Adaptation.
‘Implementation’ was a recurring theme throughout SB64. Negotiators frequently stressed that the focus must now shift from negotiating commitments to delivering them, yet many countries continually have not specified how they will implement the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake (GST) or achieve the Paris Agreement's long-term goals. This implementation gap was also evident in discussions on the follow-up to the first GST.
Against this backdrop, the incoming COP presidency sought to position COP31 as an ‘implementation COP.’ Türkiye presented the vision for its Action Agenda and announced it would promote a global target of increasing electricity’s share of final energy consumption to 35% by 2035 and a 15% circular material use target by 2035. This move is a positive signal that implementation and sectoral transformation will receive greater political attention. However, such global aspirations must now be translated into credible national and regional implementation strategies, including stronger domestic targets and policies, including for the European Union and Germany.
The conference also reinforced the growing importance of leadership coalitions outside the formal UNFCCC negotiating process. As geopolitical tensions increasingly constrain multilateral negotiations, coalitions of ambitious countries, businesses, financial institutions, subnational, and non-state actors will be essential for sustaining momentum on implementation, mobilising investment, and demonstrating that climate action continues to advance despite political headwinds.
At the same time, Bonn highlighted that the UN climate process should be made more effective. Countries, future COP presidencies should work closely with the UN Climate Change Secretariat to advance institutional reforms that improve the process and its ability to respond to rapidly changing political and scientific realities.2
The increasingly coordinated challenge to the scientific foundations of the Paris Agreement’s scientific foundations was another concerning development. Several fossil fuel-producing countries questioned the continued relevance of the 1.5°C temperature goal, challenged the IPCC’s authority, and sought to weaken references to the GST as the central ambition mechanism under the Paris Agreement. These interventions underscore the need to defend science-based decision making within the negotiations.
At the same time, questions linger on the effectiveness of the joint leadership by Türkiye and Australia. While Türkiye maintained a visible presence throughout the Bonn conference and actively communicated its priorities, Australia played a comparatively limited public role. A clear, jointly articulated vision for the COP31 negotiations as early as possible to build confidence among Parties and provide strategic direction.
Participation at SB64 was noticeably lower than in previous years. Political priorization, travel restrictions linked to the ongoing energy crisis created logistical difficulties for many delegations. Visa delays and administrative barriers continued to impede participation, particularly for civil society organizations and representatives from the Global South. Ensuring equitable participation remains essential for maintaining the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the UN climate process.
2. Thematic deep dives
2.1 Scaling the Transition: Mitigation, Just Transition, Electrification and TAFF
SB64 took place amid deepening global energy and food crises triggered by the war in the Gulf and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Disrupted major oil, gas and fertilizer supply routes removed substantial volumes from global markets, leading to price spikes and renewed concerns about energy security and food affordability. Perhaps more than any recent geopolitical event, the crisis exposed the risks associated with continued dependence on fossil fuels and underscored how economies and societies are vulnerable to fossil-fuel-related supply shocks. This reinforced the urgency of implementing the commitments agreed to at COP28: tripling renewable energy, doubling energy efficiency, and transitioning away from fossil fuels, while upholding just transition principles.
Despite the Brazilian COP Presidency’s unsuccessful efforts at COP30 to secure a formal consensus within the negotiations on a global roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels (TAFF), the initiative demonstrated many countries’ growing political willingness to move from high-level commitments and toward concrete implementation. COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago announced that work on a TAFF roadmap would continue ahead of COP31, while the Santa Marta Process has created additional momentum among a coalition of willing countries seeking practical pathways for implementing energy transition commitments. These initiatives indicate that the debate is gradually shifting from whether the transition should happen and toward how it can be delivered.
The broader political context within the UNFCCC, however, remains highly challenging. Tensions among Parties are at an all-time high, with climate finance and means of implementation once again a central fault line. These dynamics facilitate fossil fuel-producing countries, led by Saudi Arabia, stalling on progress in mitigation-related issues. As a result, negotiations on the continuation of the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP)—currently the only formal space within the UNFCCC dedicated to discussing stronger mitigation action—failed to reach agreement and were forwarded to COP31 without text.
Similar dynamics also appeared in the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP). Although more advanced, as it had already hold its 5th Dialogue on just transition pathways for holistic approaches to food security, including with a focus on agriculture and oceans, in the context of element c) paragraph 2 of decision 3/CMA.5' in South Korea and a decision containing the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM). Even so, negotiations were difficult. The Like-Minded Developing Countries – a subgroup including Saudi Arabia, India, and China – again led some Global South countries in emphasising unilateral trade measures in both the JTM and the 5th Dialogue report.
The EU, of course, disputes this position and is one of the few Parties hoping to introduce TAFF-related language into the JTWP process. SB64 concluded by agreeing on a structure for the JTM discussions, which is an essential step for operationalising the mechanism and supporting the implementation of a just transition. The mechanism’s substantive content will be negotiated in Antalya, Türkiye, where the same fault lines are expected to remain.
Given the current conditions, attempts to reintroduce TAFF negotiations onto the formal COP31 agenda would likely trigger another divisive agenda battle and further deepen political polarisation. Building support for TAFF through the Action Agenda and visible national implementation efforts is a more promising strategy. Demonstrating that governments are translating international commitments into domestic policy is essential for maintaining credibility and political momentum. Germany, as one of the strongest proponents of a global TAFF roadmap during the Brazilian Presidency, has a particular responsibility in this regard. Developing a national TAFF implementation plan that clearly links the transition away from fossil fuels to existing climate, energy and industrial strategies would send a powerful political signal ahead of COP31. Such a plan would demonstrate that Germany is willing to implement domestically the changes it advocates internationally.
The incoming Turkish COP Presidency's decision to centre electrification in its Action Agenda is an encouraging development. Turkey has proposed a global target of increasing electricity’s share of final energy consumption to 35% by 2035 ("35 by 35"). Electrification, when driven by renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power, offers the fastest and most effective pathway for the transition away from fossil fuels. Electrification and TAFF should therefore be understood as mutually reinforcing agendas.
However, the proposal also carries considerable risks. Turkey has yet to clarify which energy sources should underpin the expansion of electricity generation. Without clear safeguards, the target could enable increased reliance on gas-fired power generation, coal-based electricity, and expanded nuclear deployment. The electrification agenda must be explicitly linked to renewable energy, particularly solar and wind power, to contribute meaningfully to climate objectives.
The EU has already announced its intent to participate in the initiative. However, a 35% electrification target by 2035 is a relatively unambitious benchmark for the EU. The EU Electrification Action Plan, published in July 2026, sets an indicative electrification target of 46% by 2040, which the Commission will assess as part of the post-2030 Energy Union package. This level of ambition is insufficient. The target should aim at a 60% electrification rate by 2040 and be complemented by a binding renewable energy target. This would strengthen the link between electrification and decarbonization, ensuring that increased electricity demand is met through renewable sources rather than creating policy signals that could encourage a broader expansion of the nuclear sector.
A 60% target would accelerate current policies that address the worsening fossil fuel crisis and rapidly improving conditions for electrification across all sectors. For international credibility, the EU must also translate its ambitions into national strategies. Germany should develop a comprehensive national electrification strategy aligned with the EU Electrification Action Plan. Germany and the EU’s combining of ambitious domestic implementation with active international diplomacy could position them as frontrunners in advancing both the global electrification agenda and implementation of TAFF commitments.
At the same time, broad international support for the "35 by 35" initiative will depend on whether developing countries receive adequate financial and technical support. Expanding electricity access, modernising grids, and integrating large shares of renewable energy require substantial investments that many countries cannot mobilise alone. Germany and the EU should therefore work with other industrialised countries to develop a credible support package that combines finance, technical assistance and grid infrastructure investments. Without such support, the electrification agenda might become another target lacking the means for implementation. With it, however, electrification could emerge as one of the most important vehicles for translating the COP28 energy package and the transition away from fossil fuels and into tangible action at COP31.
Safeguards are needed to ensure that just transition principles are upheld across global value chains. Without such safeguards, ambitious electrification targets, especially in high-income countries, could reinforce extractive relationships with the Global South. Demand would increase for critical minerals, such as copper and lithium, and for manufacturing inputs such as cables and electronic components, with producing countries continuing to shoulder disproportionate environmental and social costs of extraction, production, and electronic waste.
In this context, Turkey’s announcement in Bonn of a 15% circular material use target by 2035 signals that the COP31 host will go beyond classic climate policies and put circular economy at the heart of the green industrial transformation agenda. Raw material extraction accounts for over half of global emissions.3 Circular economy approaches also improve energy security worldwide. They limit national economies’ exposure to volatile commodity markets by reducing raw material extraction and decoupling economic activity from virgin resource consumption.
The challenge now is to ensure that this ambition produces a holistic framing of circular economy, recognising it as a systemic response to materials-driven emissions, not just a waste management theme. With electrification set to be a central COP31 priority, the link between the energy transition's demand for critical minerals makes circular economy for metals a strategic prerequisite, not a peripheral concern. Germany and the EU must use the months between Bonn and Antalya to actively defend the full waste hierarchy — including refuse, reduce, reuse, repair, remanufacture — in the Action Agenda deliverables. They must push to widen the material scope beyond organics and plastics to the sectors the energy transition will most depend on.
2.2 Resilience Under Pressure: Adaptation, Food Systems and Loss & Damage
As delegates met in Bonn for the UN climate negotiations (SB64), climate impacts continued to intensify worldwide. Extreme heat, floods, storms and droughts affected communities across multiple regions. Meanwhile, scientists increasingly warn of “climate whiplash” – rapid shifts between extremes that overwhelm societies and ecosystems. A likely El Niño event in the second half of 2026 could further amplify climate risks, particularly in already vulnerable regions.
The fragility of global food systems has been exposed in recent years, as climate shocks disrupt agricultural production and supply chains while geopolitical crises, including the wars in Ukraine and Iran, drive up the costs of energy, fertilizer and imported foods. Current agricultural systems’ strong dependence on fossil fuel-based fertilizers has increased production costs and exposed farmers to price volatility, fuelling inflation and food insecurity. International aid cuts and weakened multilateralism further limit coordinated responses.
The Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security (SSJWA) failed to meet even the limited expectations for SB64, with Parties only “taking note” of key reports instead of agreeing on strong recommendations to speed up climate action on agriculture and food security within the UNFCCC. Recurring debates over the agenda’s scope, particularly adaptation versus a broader food systems approach, slowed progress. However, awareness is growing: 97% of NDCs now include agrifood measures, though significant gaps remain especially in climate action on sustainable diets and reduction of food loss and waste.4
At COP31 in Antalya, Parties must finalize outstanding SSJWA outputs, take stock of progress, and agree on a successor framework. Informal exchanges beforehand will be critical. Substantively, strengthening food security through climate negotiations requires scaling up finance to build resilient food systems, supporting farmers and vulnerable communities, and decreasing dependence on fossil fuel based inputs and food imports. For Germany and the EU, this also implies actively promoting multilateral cooperation and diplomacy and leading by example by ambitious implementation.
The need for adaptation has never been more urgent. Yet geopolitical tensions, debt burdens and shrinking fiscal space increasingly compound climate vulnerability. Many developing countries face growing challenges in investing in resilience, while international support remains insufficient. Notably, adaptation finance continues to fall far short of rapidly increasing needs.
These tensions were clearly reflected in negotiations on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), aimed at operationalising the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (FGCR). At Bonn, the Belem decision on tripling adaptation finance, a taskforce’s work on the Belem indicator list, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap’s future, and the review of the FGCR. However, parties remained deeply divided over the composition of the indicator taskforce but more fundamentally, over how and where the tripling of adaptation finance should be tackled. While developing countries called for the full and urgent delivery of the Belém commitment to increase the trajectory towards the tripling of adaptation finance and the efforts to strengthen transparency and accountability towards it, developed countries felt the GGA room was not the space for this discussion.
Negotiators were unable to bridge these differences, despite intensive discussions. Questions about adaptation finance, the taskforce’s post-SB64 work and the future of the BAR remained unresolved. SB64 ended without agreement on draft conclusions for COP31 (Rule 16). Negotiations on the GGA, thus, will effectively restart in Antalya. This is a disappointing and concerning outcome given the urgency to strengthen global adaptation efforts.
For vulnerable countries and communities already experiencing severe climate impacts, continued delays are increasingly difficult to justify. Effective adaptation requires not only better measurement but also greater support for implementation, including resilient infrastructure, early warning systems, climate-resilient agriculture and social protection. Without progress on both immediate action and support, the GGA’s credibility risks being undermined.
At the same time, escalating climate impacts create pressure to move forward. The months before COP31 will be critical for rebuilding trust and finding common ground on the GGA indicator framework. A key test will be whether governments are prepared to match adaptation ambitions with concrete commitments on finance and implementation support. Ultimately, the success will not on decision text alone but by whether it accelerates resilience for people now facing climate impacts.
Insufficient mitigation and adaptation coupled with increasing climate impacts, are rapidly increasing loss and damage (L&D) and worsening threats to human security worldwide. Extreme weather events and slow-onset processes are undermining food security, threatening lives and health, and eroding livelihoods. Yet, despite the growing scale and urgency of these impacts, L&D was notably absent from the formal negotiation agenda at SB64 following the conclusion of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) review at COP30 in Belém.
Nevertheless, L&D stayed visible throughout SB64. Numerous side events, civil society actions and informal workshops underscored the issue’s continued political relevance, with particular attention given to finance needs, implementation of best practices, and emerging national institutional arrangements. Discussions highlighted examples of national response systems and explored options for accessing the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FrLD). SB64 also showed how closely L&D is intrinsically linked to other agenda items, including food systems, adaptation, and climate finance. Negotiators raised the issue in the different rooms, and it became clear that the topic cannot be ignored.
Looking to COP31 and beyond, Parties need a dedicated negotiation agenda item on L&D to fully implement Article 8 of the Paris Agreement. The item could examine how the L&D architecture (Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage [FrLD], Santiago Network on Loss and Damage [SNLD], and Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage [WIM]) functions and meets existing needs. It could also draw on the forthcoming State of Loss and Damage report (aka Loss and Damage Gap Report) Loss and Damage Status quo report, including its findings on financial needs and contributions. This would include how to fund the FRLD at the required scale and coordinate and expand the funding arrangements on L&D beyond an annual high-level meeting.
While July approval is expected for the first project proposals, the FRLD remains severely underfinanced. Current pledges amount to USD 822 million, far below projected needs. Estimates indicate annual L&D costs in developing countries could reach USD 447–894 billion by 2030. The FRLD’s 2027 replenishment cycle must therefore deliver sufficient finance.
Beyond the formal negotiations, the COP31 Action Agenda offers a pivotal opportunity to advance resilience. Mitigation initiatives have traditionally dominated the Action Agenda, but resilience-building efforts should receive comparable political visibility and support. The COP31 Action Agenda pays too little attention to resilience. While it includes links to areas such as food security—an opportunity to address resilience adequately. The shift toward implementation should bring greater attention to existing initiatives and the immense needs.
Nations, cities, regions, development banks, businesses and civil society organisations can play a critical role in accelerating implementation by scaling up investments, strengthening resilience planning and facilitating the exchange of best practices. Concrete initiatives on heat action plans, early warning systems, climate-resilient infrastructure and food systems, coastal protection and health system resilience could demonstrate effective adaptation in practice. Elevating resilience initiatives and providing space for a coalition of the willing within the Action Agenda would complement progress under the UNFCCC and help translate international commitments into tangible benefits for vulnerable communities.
2.3 The Climate Finance Work Programme, the Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c), and Adaptation Fund transition and governance
Climate finance had a relatively small presence in the formal SB64 agenda, but it emerged as one of the most prominent and politically sensitive issues across negotiation rooms, mandated events, and side discussions. Discussions were marked by diminishing trust among Parties amid declining official development assistance, constrained public budgets in developed countries, and persistent concerns over the delivery of climate finance commitments.
This was particularly evident in discussions under the new Climate Finance Work Programme and the Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c). Both processes aimed to support implementation and advance finance-related outcomes ahead of COP31, yet their formats were inadequately structured to enable meaningful progress.
In the Climate Finance Work Programme, three “engagement workshops” were held in Bonn, but discussions quickly exposed Parties’ differing expectations. Developing countries, led by the G77 and China, argued that before engaging on substantive issues, there needed to be greater clarity on the programme’s scope, modalities, and institutional status, emphasising that a dedicated space should be provided to discuss developed countries’ obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. Developed countries sought to focus discussions on broader climate finance architecture issues, including mobilization of private finance, transparency, and expanding the contributor base. While workshops explored themes such as finance provision and mobilization, access, and transparency, many participants expressed frustration with the format and lack of a formal negotiating space. Several developing country Parties called for the CFWP to be formally reflected on the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) agenda to ensure meaningful political engagement and sustained progress.
Although not as prominently, similar tensions emerged in the Veredas Dialogue on Article 2.1(c) in complementarity with Article 9, which succeeds the Sharm el-Sheikh Dialogue and aims to support implementation of the Paris Agreement goal of making financial flows consistent with low-emission, climate-resilient development pathways. Discussions focused on national experiences in aligning investment frameworks with climate and development objectives and highlighted the role of private-sector mobilization and investment de-risking. However, several developing countries expressed concern that the dialogue overemphasised private finance and domestic efforts and inadequately addressed international public finance, especially for adaptation and support for developing countries. Private sector representatives also joined the dialogue. These movements exposed a mismatch between financial concepts and conditions on the ground, especially when they assessed adaptation investments in terms of risk, return and scalability.
Developing countries challenged this framing, arguing that the most effective adaptation interventions are often hyperlocal public goods rather than investable assets. They encouraged the private sector to focus on mitigation-related projects and programmes. Questions were also raised regarding the dialogue format, with calls for more balanced representation of developed and developing country perspectives and a clearer distinction between discussions on Article 2.1(c) and those relating to Article 9 obligations. The discussions will continue before COP31 through the high-level Xingu Finance Talks, held in parallel with the World Bank Annual Meeting in Bangkok in October 2026. The dialogue co-chairs have indicated that topics related to credit ratings, fiscal space, the high cost of capital, and debt will be taken up in Bangkok, where relevant actors from outside the UNFCCC will be present.
In formal negotiations, discussions on matters related to the Adaptation Fund focused on three interconnected issues: the Fund’s transition to exclusively serving the Paris Agreement, the Adaptation Fund Board’s composition, and the Fund’s fifth review. While these discussions are largely technical, they exposed broader political disagreements that have prevented progress for several years. Developing country groups prioritized advancing the transition process to enable monetising of the share of proceeds generated under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement, with the monetizing of the share of proceeds expected to become a key source of adaptation finance. Several Parties argued that discussions on Board membership and the Fund’s review should not delay this objective.
The question of how to align the Fund's governance arrangements with the Paris Agreement is at the centre of the debate. The alignment includes updating references inherited from the Kyoto Protocol era, such as replacing Annex I/non-Annex I terminology with developed/developing country language. Developed countries, especially the EU and Switzerland, argued that these governance changes are an essential component of the transition and cannot be separated from it, but many developing countries sought a more pragmatic approach that would allow operational steps toward receiving Article 6.4 proceeds to advance while broader governance issues remain under discussion. The exchanges highlighted how seemingly procedural questions about terminology, Board composition, and institutional arrangements are closely linked to wider debates on representation, eligibility, differentiation, and equity within the climate regime. As a result, Parties made only limited progress, though discussions suggested a possible pathway forward through interim arrangements that could facilitate receiving Article 6.4 proceeds while negotiations on the remaining transition issues continue.
Restoring confidence in the climate finance architecture will be critical. Many Parties underscored the need for more effective and better-structured processes that can address outstanding questions on NCQG implementation, public finance obligations under Article 9.1, and the role of broader financial flows under Article 2.1(c). As negotiations move toward COP31, there are increasing calls to strengthen the mandate and institutional footing of the Climate Finance Work Programme and a redesigned Veredas Dialogue that supports more substantive, action-oriented discussions. Progress on these issues will be essential for unlocking movement across other areas of the climate agenda, including mitigation, just transition, adaptation and support, and will help shift the process from negotiation to implementation.
3. Looking ahead to COP 31
The Bonn meeting and the broader climate policy community raise several questions for the months ahead.
- How can outcomes at climate conferences better match the speed at which the climate crisis—and global energy transition are unfolding as well as Parties’ expectations? What should change?
- The second GST of the Paris Agreement starts in Antalya in November. What should be considered in the next round of the ambition cycle?
- What should happen between now and COP31?
The expectations for climate conferences may not fully align with what the UNFCCC process is currently able and designed to deliver. The process has entered a post-text-negotiation era, since the Paris Agreement and its rulebook are in place and ready to implement. A UN environmental convention and its negotiations may not be the most suitable place to implement climate policy; therefore, other forums may be better at meeting some of these justified expectations. That is not to say that the climate conferences do not need to change and deliver more – they certainly do.
Future COPs should evolve from negotiation-heavy conferences into a global ambition, implementation, accountability, and mobilisation space. The COP would act as a nerve centre for the broader climate policy system. Organised into blue, turquoise, and green zones, it would provide a forum for connecting actors, increasing ambition, and accelerating implementation, while maintaining a shared direction under the Paris Agreement. Climate governance success would increasingly depend on emissions reductions, resilience outcomes, fossil fuel phase-down, mobilised finance, and faster transformation in practice, rather than on negotiated text.
The second GST, culminating at COP33 in 2028, provides a framework for evaluating how effective various efforts have been at achieving the Paris Agreement goals and building support for the reforms needed to make them more coherent and impactful. Ideally, it will set the pace, ensure accountability, drive ambition and guide the ambition cycle. Lessons from how the first GST informed (or did not inform) the new NDCs are a basis for modifying the second GST’s design and execution. The GST findings should translate into clear action, beyond NDCs, to strengthen the envisioned ambition cycle. Parties should consider including the Action Agenda.
The GST results, through independent analysis by civil society, can also help reveal whether countries violated international law and which countries or alliances are making substantive progress. The International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on States’ obligations vis-à-vis climate change provide an interpretation of international law for this purpose. Critically, the GST, together with other assessments, could considerably strengthen political pressure by civil society and bilaterally between countries concerning those delivering and those falling short. In this way, it should firmly inform the fourth generation of NDCs and the implementation of the other two Paris goals (Articles 2.1 b and c). Meanwhile, Parties should submit the outstanding third generation NDCs and fully implement all current NDCs – requiring adequate funding.
Several areas need to make progress before COP31:
- Parties, presidencies and civil society should clarify what they mean by ‘implementation’ and explore how it can raise ambition, support a shared direction, address financial barriers, and be clearly monitored. As one measure, the Global Implementation Accelerator and Belém Mission 1.5 need to be further developed and concretized.
- Make diplomatic efforts to unlock the climate finance impasse for adaptation, L&D, and mitigation.
- Clarify that the proposed electrification target should not involve fossil fuel-generated electricity.
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Rebuild trust and find common ground on the GGA indicator framework.
- Gain further clarity on the TAFF and Forest Roadmaps, including next steps and means of engagement.
- Align approaches, strategies, and visions for COP31 by the two presidencies. The COP31 presidencies must learn from the Bonn session, work to communicate a coherent joint vision on their areas of responsibility, and build the political momentum needed for a balanced and ambitious package within and outside the negotiations. Working with the Subsidiary Bodies (SB) Chairs, they can encourage continued dialogue between and with Parties ahead of COP31.
- Clarify how to advance institutional reforms that improve the UNFCCC process and its ability to respond to rapidly changing political and scientific realities.
Footnotes
1 Three agenda items were closed under Rule 16 of the Draft Rules of Procedure of the UNFCCC. This rule provides that any agenda item whose consideration is completed at a session is automatically included in the next session’s provisional agenda unless the Conference of the Parties decides otherwise. In practice, when an agenda item is ‘closed under Rule 16,’ it means negotiations ended without reaching agreement and the item is deferred to a subsequent session for further consideration.
2 See “From Negotiations to Delivery. Rethinking international climate governance.” Available at: https://www.germanwatch.org/en/93510
3 UNEP, Global Resources Outlook 2024, p. 15, https://www.unep.org/resources/Global-Resource-Outlook-2024
4 Climate Focus, Food Forward NDCs (2026), https://climatefocus.com/publications/foodforwardndcs2026/
