SB Debrief

Some technical progress was made in Bonn, notably on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme (UAE JTWP). The fact that a majority of countries continued negotiations and endeavoured to make progress despite the USA’s absence was another positive signal. Nevertheless, an overarching political framework is still missing after Bonn, and it proved impossible to develop a common vision for a successful COP30 in Brazil. Key issues such as the ambition gap and the need to adequately scale up climate finance were not on the official agenda. Climate finance was a recurring theme, revealing entrenched positions on the part of some countries. Thus an agenda fight following the demand by the Group of Like-minded Developing Countries (LMDC) to include a separate agenda item on public climate finance delayed the start of the conference by two days.

The incoming COP Presidency, Brazil, used Bonn for constructive talks with the Parties and also helped to bridge differences during the GGA negotiations. However, the Presidency remained vague about how it intends to make concrete progress going forward on the key issues mentioned above. 

The SB sessions took place against a backdrop of armed conflicts and massive human rights violations in a number of regions. In a time of global instability, it is clearer than ever that the Paris Agreement is rooted in international law, human rights, and multilateralism. Functioning multilateralism is the basic prerequisite for successful climate negotiations.

Key SB62 negotiation tracks on mitigation and ambition – the UAE dialogue (UAED) and the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) – remained stalled. For the UAED, the COP30 Presidency’s goal of finalising modalities was not met. While the Parties agreed that the dialogue should support Global Stocktake (GST) implementation without duplicating existing functions, progress was blocked by deep divisions over its scope, outputs, and structure. Disagreements on finance, trade measures, and the interface to the second GST also stalled talks. Until these are resolved, the dialogue’s role in advancing the agreed COP28 outcomes – and especially paragraph 28 on renewables, energy efficiency, and transitioning away from fossil fuels – remains uncertain.

With regard to the MWP, talks remained gridlocked. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the EU, and Australia pushed to incorporate GST findings to raise ambition, while the LMDCs and others stressed a non-prescriptive approach in line with decision 4/CMA.4. Brazil’s proposal for a voluntary digital platform to match mitigation projects with finance added energy to the discussions, but raised concerns over the platform’s mandate fit and whether it would distract from core tasks. The talks ended without agreement.

In a next step, COP30 must confront the widening ambition gap. A formal outcome that advances implementation of the GST – and particularly of paragraph 28 on energy and paragraph 33 on nature – is urgently needed and is obviously linked to the new NDCs. The Action Agenda can support momentum but must be anchored in formal decisions by the UNFCCC. The COP30 Presidency should facilitate inclusive consultations to rebuild trust and convergence, especially on politically sensitive items. The Leaders’ Segment in Belém should feature a dedicated high-level moment on energy transitions and on the just implementation of paragraph 28, paired with tangible commitments.

At SB62, negotiations on the GGA finally received the long-lacking political and media attention that this topic deserves. An opening workshop brought experts and Parties together to assess a draft indicator list. The aim was to support operationalisation of the GGA’s UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience with its seven thematic and four dimensional targets. Negotiations showed that key divergences remain ahead of COP30 in Belém. Developing countries, and in particular the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), supported by all G77 countries and China, stressed the need to introduce indicators such as finance and capacity-building for the means of implementation (MOI), while developed countries called for a streamlined, technical approach with an emphasis on national enabling conditions. The talks eventually succeeded in providing guidance for the ongoing technical work by the experts who have been tasked with producing the final proposed indicator list in good time for COP30. Importantly, this work will include MOI indicators. The continued political will to include MOI and finance indicators is essential to finalising a robust outcome in Belém and hence finally operationalising the GGA. A political process is needed ahead of COP30 to ensure this.

Discussion of the indicators and the disagreements on the MOI dominated the talks, leaving insufficient time for full discussion of two other items on the GGA agenda – the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and transformational adaptation. COP30 will have to find a way forward for both of these topics under the guidance of the Brazilian presidency.

The finance agenda had been light following agreement of the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG) in Baku last year. However, the discussions in Bonn revealed unresolved issues. First, following the LMDC proposal, the G77 and China pushed to add an agenda item on the provision of public finance. Although this was not agreed, consultations were held and are to conclude by COP30. Second, there was a push to include an adaptation finance target under the GGA. Both issues are likely to resurface at COP30. 

Two finance events were held in Bonn: the first 2025 workshop under the Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on Article 2 paragraph 1(c), and consultations by the COP29 and COP30 Presidencies on the Baku to Belém Roadmap. The dialogue explored capacity building for national financial sector development, transition planning, and supporting the NCQG. Openness towards Article 2 paragraph 1(c) is re-emerging following the end of the NCQG negotiations, although differing views exist. The Presidencies’ consultation with the Parties displayed uncertainty regarding the overall process (including integrating the content of the consultations in the Roadmap), the relevance of the parallel process at the Circle of Finance Ministers, and aspirations as to the COP30 outcome. The Parties had conflicting expectations, especially regarding public versus private finance. 

The AF’s transition to exclusively serving the Paris Agreement, AF Board membership, and the fifth review of the Fund were also on the agenda in Bonn. While there was broad agreement on the transition – including steps relating to trustee arrangements and secretariat services – progress was blocked by political tensions over Board membership, and particularly Russia’s continued obstruction of appointments. This has left four of the sixteen AF Board seats vacant and only two held by representatives from developed countries. Developing countries fear that opening the governance discussion could endanger their majority on the Board. This led to a split, with developed countries pushing for a single draft decision covering all three items and developing countries preferring separate conclusions that would allow progress to be made on transition without risking the loss of their Board majority. No agreement was reached, and even the status of the Bonn draft text as a basis for COP30 is unclear. At the same time, while negotiations focused on legal details, concerns grew over the Fund’s resource gap, since only USD 11 million has been pledged so far toward its modest minimum USD 300 million target for 2025. Developed countries must deliver substantial multi-year pledges by COP30 if the AF is to triple its outflows as promised under the NCQG.

L&D had a very low profile on the SB62 agenda and, since the COP30 Presidency is not prioritising the topic, there is a serious risk that it could be sidelined at COP30 and in future negotiations. This is a deeply concerning development for a topic that is of particular relevance to Global South Parties, given that impacts continue to increase worldwide.

SB62 marked the second attempt to negotiate the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) review, with Parties again failing to reach a final compromise. The negotiations concluded with an informal note, which will be forwarded to COP30. While not a breakthrough, this does at least represent some progress compared to Baku. There the Parties left without any text at all, forcing them to start drafting from scratch in Bonn. Disappointingly, nearly all sessions on the WIM review were closed to observers, limiting transparency and broader engagement.

The informal note includes important additions, including at least an acknowledgement of the current L&D finance gap. It also contains text on an L&D gap/status quo report, which would assess current impacts and highlight good practices on addressing L&D. Such a report could regularly draw attention to the topic. Despite this, there are still major gaps in the text, particularly on quantifying needs and providing guidelines on how to include L&D in the NDCs. The WIM review is expected to be finalised at COP30.

After the move to include L&D in the NCQG in Baku failed, it is still uncertain whether and how the Baku to Belém Roadmap will address L&D finance. This gap urgently needs to be closed in order to respond to growing needs and accelerate resource mobilisation for the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD). Prolonging its underfunding does not help anyone. A dedicated high-level segment focusing exclusively on financing the FRLD, and including concrete pledging moments, must therefore be held at COP30.

The push for synergies and for a more integrated approach between the three Rio Conventions (the UNFCCC, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)) gained momentum in Bonn. Their fragmentation has often hindered coherent national policymaking, with actions in one area at times negatively affecting the others. In 2024, the CBD’s COP16 adopted a decision calling on the Presidencies of the CBD and UNFCCC COPs to strengthen multilateral coordination. The decision also invited submissions, including on a potential joint work programme for all three Conventions. The Brazilian Presidency hosted a special event in Bonn to explore synergies between the Rio Conventions, with a view to a decision being taken in Belém. The Parties also addressed the issue in the SBSTA in the context of co-operation with other international organisations. The latter include the Joint Liaison Group between the Rio Convention secretariats, which mainly focuses on capacity building and knowledge sharing – things seen by many as insufficient. While developed countries stress integration at national level, developing countries are calling for systemic changes to reduce reporting burdens and avoid double-counting finance. The Parties and observers are to submit their views ahead of COP30. However, it is not yet clear how prominently the issue will feature on the agenda, and if and how synergies between the Rio Conventions will be integrated with the UN/UNFCCC reform process.